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ABSTRACT 
Employer provided Qualified Plans (―Qualified Plans‖) are the most efficient supplement 
to Social Security savings and benefits. Given the significance of the benefits provided as well as 
the short-term Revenue constraints upon the Federal government in the form of substantially 
protracted tax deferrals, Qualified Plan legislation should maintain a conservative disposition.  
Incremental legislative action in the right direction will steadily graduate ERISA to its intended 
purpose. Unfortunately ERISA is a convoluted maze of formalities, definitions, and regulation 
that are only substantially understood by an expert and have yet to be adequately explained to the 
public at large.  
Recent publications such as Retirement Heist rouse the public‘s consciousness of 
retirement Plans by enumerating perceived abuses by large corporations.  These alleged abuses 
certainly reflect innovative manipulations within the constraints of Qualified Plans. However, 
my thesis will prove that these ―abuses‖ reflect the United States‘ disposition toward the rights of 
proprietorship regarding the Qualified Plan. The intent of the thesis is to illustrate this disposition 
through a study of the Amara v. Cigna Corp. case as well as a review of an actual LLC‘s defined 
benefit plan conversion to a cash balance plan. I will compare and contrast the different 
approaches taken by these two employers and justify the varied success they each experienced in 
converting their plans. Through this process, the thesis shall draw conclusions on the United 
States‘ dispositions toward ownership of the qualified plan. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
I. Introduction 
 
Employer provided Qualified Plans (―Qualified Plans‖) are the most efficient supplement 
to Social Security savings and benefits. An Employer‘s access to large mutual funds, capacity to 
pay administrative fees, and capacity to staff administration for the Plan make Employer 
provided Plans a serious driving force behind the United States‘ future retirement welfare.  What 
separates Employer provided Qualified Plans from Employer provided nonqualified plans is that 
the former is in compliance with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (―ERISA‖) and 
therefore indirectly benefits from Federal government subsidization through tax deductions and 
exemptions.  This subsidy is provided by establishing a legal tax shelter for the plan and 
participants (see Appendix B). Employer contributions to participants are immediately tax 
deductible for the Employer‘s company and any contributions by Employees (see appendix B)—
often considered deferrals—are excluded from their taxable income (Krass, 2010 §1 p.1). These 
contributions become Plan Assets and are all invested (unless the Employee elects to direct their 
own investments provided their Plan permits them to do so) in a trust that is tax exempt under 26 
USC 501(a)—which in turn must also be qualified under 26 USC 401(a)—and distributions from 
the plan are taxable when received by the participant. Distributions are generally made from the 
plan upon or after the participant‘s retirement but Plan documents (see Appendix B) may permit 
earlier untaxed distributions on account of death, disability, and other exceptions (Krass, 2010 
§16 p. 3-4). Further, the gains earned on these investments of Plan Assets are not taxable by the 
federal government. All taxation in these processes, with exceptions, is limited to distributions to 
the participants upon their retirement. 
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Given the significance of the benefits provided as well as the short-term Revenue 
constraints upon the Federal government in the form of substantially protracted tax deferrals, 
Qualified Plan legislation should maintain a conservative disposition.  Government-subsidized 
Employer-provided retirement savings are guided from the onset by principles concerning the 
availability of benefits, the rights of the proprietor, requisiteness of contract, and fidelity toward 
obligation. The ideal Qualified Plan synthesizes these principles by incentivizing the Employer 
(see Appendix B) to provide the former two while establishing heavy punitive damages for 
violating the latter two.  Incremental legislative action in the right direction will graduate ERISA 
toward this ideal. Unfortunately ERISA is a convoluted maze of formalities, definitions, and 
regulation that are only substantially understood by an expert and have yet to be adequately 
explained to the public at large. Recent publications such as Retirement Heist rouse the public‘s 
consciousness of retirement Plans by enumerating perceived abuses by large corporations.  These 
alleged abuses certainly reflect innovative manipulations within the constraints of Qualified 
Plans. However, my thesis will prove that these ―abuses‖ reflect the United States‘ disposition 
toward the rights of proprietorship regarding the Qualified Plan. Only a consistent and sincere 
national disposition toward ownership—as opposed to subjective tactics such as lobbying—
would lead that Department of Labor (―DOL‖), the Internal Revenue Service (―IRS‖) and the 
federal Courts to permit the actions which are espoused as corporate ―abuses‖ of the Qualified 
Plan. The rights of proprietorship include a duality of concerns—the Employer and the 
Employee. While the Employer is dependent upon the Employee to perform the necessary 
functions of an organization, the Employee depends upon the Employer for compensation. This 
dependency includes the benefits and options available in a Qualified Plan. While minimum 
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wages are a non-voluntary mandate nearly unilaterally enforced by the government for the 
benefit of every Employee, Qualified Plans in contrast are entirely voluntary programs that 
Employers alone are responsible for engaging and administrating. The fact that qualified 
retirement plans are implemented by the Employer necessitates a degree of sensitivity on the part 
of lawmakers to the needs of the Employer. Like any business decision, the decision whether to 
adopt and maintain a retirement plan must conform to the cost/benefit paradigm. ERISA‘s 
purpose is to reduce the cost to the Employer for providing Employees with retirement benefits 
in order to, in turn, provide the greatest benefit to society by maximizing participants and their 
retirement benefits.  
Why does an Employer elect to start a Qualified Plan for their company? Qualified Plans 
are adopted by Employers in order to attract employees, reduce employee turnover, increase 
employee incentive, and to establish a tax-efficient method of accumulating funds from the 
company for their retirement (Krass, 2010 §1 p.1). The nonqualified plans can also satisfy the 
former three but any funds they establish are vulnerable to creditors in the case of a default or 
bankruptcy; nonqualified Plans can receive funded treatment, but ―it usually will have to satisfy 
the numerous and often burdensome requirements contained in Title I of ERISA, which pertain 
to participation and vesting, funding, and fiduciary requirements‖ (Downey, 2010 §1 p. 15-16). 
This makes a non-qualified Plan significantly less reliable than a Qualified Plan because a 
Qualified Plan‘s investments are held in a spendthrift trust meaning they are not technically part 
of the Employer or Employee‘s assets with respect to the fact that they are inaccessible to 
creditors (Ferenczy, 2012 §4 p. 3). For a Defined Contribution (―DC‖) Plan as well as a Defined 
Benefit (―DB‖) Plan, Employers accumulate funds for their retirement by contributing to the 
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Plan. However, most people with the leverage to make the decision to adopt a Qualified Plan—
all whom would be considered ―Employers‖ pursuant to ERISA—are Highly Compensated 
Employees (―HCEs‖; see Appendix B) that must conform to specific non-discriminatory rules 
with respect to the Plan. These non-discrimination rules include the requirement that HCEs can 
only make a contribution or receive a benefit that is at most marginally greater than eligible non-
excluded Non-Highly Compensated Employees (―NHCEs‖) (Krass, 2010 §27 p. 130-131).  The 
IRS has often ruled against Employers attempting to abuse these provisions by excluding certain 
classes of otherwise eligible employees from the plan (Krass, 2010 §4 p. 10). For any type of 
Qualified Plan with NHCEs and HCEs for participants, coverage rules require that ―the 
percentage of NHCEs who benefit under the retirement plan must equal at least 70 percent of the 
percentage of HCEs‖ or ―the average benefit percentage of NHCEs of the employer must equal 
at least 70 percent of the average benefit percentage for HCEs of the employer‖ (Krass, 2010 §5 
p. 16, 18).  The Employer with a Qualified Plan is incentivized, therefore, to encourage as many 
eligible NHCEs to participate and contribute the highest percentage of their compensation 
possible in order to reach the maximum contribution limit as established by the IRS. This 
Employer may make a discretionary contribution to the Employee‘s account for the purpose of 
raising the percentage of compensation contributed in order to pass non-discrimination testing. 
This Employer may also include a provision to ―match‖ any Employee contribution with an 
Employer contribution which in turn acts as an incentive for the participant to contribute, further 
increasing the percentage of compensation contributed. The employer with a DB plan is similarly 
incentivized by non-discrimination rules to permit NHCEs to receive a greater benefit upon 
retirement because that means the HCEs are also permitted to receive this higher benefit. With 
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the exception of age discrimination, this is the extent to which I will be discussing the non-
discriminatory requirements of ERISA. The degree of explanation required would only be 
marginally beneficial to the thesis and significantly onerous to both the reader as well as the 
author. 
II. Significance of Study  
 
As illustrated, ERISA‘s tax benefits promote the Qualified Plan‘s adoption by Employers 
whereas the non-discrimination and coverage rules incentivize the Employer to ensure that as 
many eligible Employees participate as possible and that they receive a fair percentage of their 
compensation as a benefit. Therefore, a delicate balance between benefits, flexibility, and 
regulation is maintained within Qualified Plans established by the current rules in ERISA. Public 
concerns over these rules in a democratic society will inevitably lead to legislative changes in 
ERISA as well as non-qualified plans. The quality of these legislative changes will be 
determined by the dispositions of elected representatives whose outlooks are determined, in turn, 
by the moods of the voting public. Most of the voting public do not possess adequate context 
regarding the balance between benefits, flexibility, and regulation that make Qualified Plans 
attractive to Employers in the first place.  Even Employees participating in a Qualified Plan do 
not possess adequate knowledge regarding this balance—the Summary Plan Description 
(―SPD‖), additional disclosure, and Plan Document available to them only define the terms of the 
Plan and provide no explanation for the reasons behind these terms. In this platonic cave of 
forms the only shades of information available to the public at large concerning ERISA‘s 
incentive/regulation balance are from the news media. The degree of deliberation involved in 
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regulations and court decisions establishing this balance within the voluntary Qualified Plan 
should receive as much expression as the Employee-oriented journalistic coverage on the matter. 
I believe the disposition of Qualified Plan ownership in the United States as established through 
the courts and current industry practices will assist the consistency and statutory health of ERISA 
and its amendments.   
III. Review of the Literature 
Industry Guidance Publications 
 
 The most essential guidance on Qualified Plan administration comes from Sal Tripodi‘s 
The ERISA Outline Book, the BNA‘s Tax Management Portfolios, and Aspen Publishers‘ 
―Answer Books‖ on retirement plans. These publications impart a prose interpretation of 
Qualified Plan regulations as they relate to common and specific administrative inquiries. They 
often identify legislative ambiguities and promote court, Internal Revenue Service and 
Department of Labor opinions on the language of regulation. These publications often lack 
perspective from recent cases of Qualified Plan manipulation which have not been specifically 
identified as prohibited by regulatory oversight. While it can be reasonably inferred that anything 
is permitted granted it is not expressly forbidden by previous interpretations of ERISA, guidance 
from these publications provide insufficient perspective on Employers‘ Plan activities that have 
been carried out unchallenged.  The thesis will illustrate an activity that lacks adequate 
expression in industry guidance. This activity is the replacement of a Defined Benefit Plan with a 
Cash Balance Plan. Generally, the conversion ultimately reduces the potential future benefit 
accruals of participants—in apparent contradiction to the anti-cutback rules of IRC §411(d)(6). 
  7 
The thesis will identify and contextualize this contradiction and then draw conclusions on the 
United States‘ legal disposition toward Qualified Plan ownership. 
Retirement Heist & Other Reports on Qualified Plan Manipulations 
 
These publications indirectly guide the discussion and intent of this thesis. The 
conversion of a DB plan to a cash balance plan has been identified by journalists an ―abuse‖ 
because of the activity‘s seemingly contradictory relationship to the legislative intent of ERISA. 
While industry guidance only reflects the Employer‘s perspective, journalism on Qualified Plan 
―abuses‖ is highly orientated toward the Employee‘s perspective. However, journalists, like the 
Employees they cover, also lack the technical background to analyze Plan mechanics and 
therefore suffer from an inability to distinguish where a failure in regulation has occurred, if at 
all. Further, journalism on these ―abuses‖ does not adequately express the opinions of the IRS 
and DOL despite that fact that these departments are the most vocal and authoritative specialists 
on retirement plans in the United States.  These articles‘ silence on IRS‘ and DOL‘s opinions and 
activities is the equivalent of writing an article on prison violence and omitting the actions of the 
prison guards and the warden. The thesis will illustrate Qualified Plan abuses from a structural 
and legal perspective and address how the IRS‘, Federal Court‘s and the DOL‘s stance reflects 
the United States‘ broader stance on ownership of the Qualified Plan. 
III. Methods and Procedures 
 
The Qualified Plan ―abuse‖ I illustrate will be contextualized and ultimately reflect the 
extent of the Employers‘ ownership of the entity and plan given the acts‘ legitimacy as granted 
by Qualified Plan regulators. Concerning the reduction of potential benefits as well as 
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disclosures to participants I will gather data on an investment agency that shall be deemed 
Employer X, LLC and how they performed a conversion from a DB plan to a cash balance plan. 
With this data I will relate the attorney‘s guidance and subsequent amendments to the 
Employers‘ sovereignty over the plans. I will also review the recent CIGNA v. Amara cases for 
further details on the permissibility of cuts in potential benefits. These analyses will culminate 
into an assessment of the Employer‘s right to control the Qualified Plan, particularly the defined 
benefit plan. 
IV. Structure 
 
The thesis will be structured as follows. The objective of Chapter One is to provide 
background, methods, and the significance of the study. Chapter Two illustrates Employers‘ 
adjustment from a Defined Benefit Plan to a Cash Balance Plan and explores the Employer‘s 
latitude to make cuts in potential benefits. In Chapter Three, final conclusions are drawn 
concerning the extent of the Employer‘s Plan ownership given the permissibility of these 
Qualified Plan manipulations. 
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CHAPTER II: THE DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN‘S CONVERSION TO A CASH 
BALANCE PLAN 
I. Amara v. Cigna Corp.  
a. Overview of Facts 
 
Prior to 1998 CIGNA Corporation ran a defined benefit plan in the form of an annuity 
based upon the employee‘s salary and length of service. The retirement benefit provided to an 
employee in this plan would either equal (1) 2% of the employee‘s average salary over his/her 
final three years with the employer multiplied by the number of years worked—up to 30—or (2) 
1⅔% of his/her average salary over their final five years with the employer multiplied by the 
number of years worked—up to 35 (CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 2011). The participants who 
received the benefit calculated by the first formula were all employees hired before December 
31, 1988 and were considered ―Tier 1 employees‖. The participants that received the benefit 
calculated by the latter formula were all employees hired after December 31, 1988 and were 
considered ―Tier 2 employees‖ (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008). Both methods calculated in this 
fashion provide an annual retirement benefit that approaches roughly 60% of an employee‘s final 
salary over time payable only in the form of an annuity. This plan also included an option to 
receive early retirement benefits at age 55 that provided a larger annuity than the employee 
would have been received under the aforementioned terms (CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 2011). 
After 1998 CIGNA implemented a new plan that creates an individual retirement account for 
each employee in which the employer contributes an amount equal to between 3% and 8.5% of 
the employee‘s salary depending upon age, length of service, and other factors (see table 1). This 
account then earns compound interest at a rate equal to the return on 5-year treasury bills the 
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previous November (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008) plus .25% but cannot earn less than 4.5% or 
more than 9%. The employee receives the amount on his/her individual account upon retirement 
in either the form of a lump sum or annuity. The retirement benefits employees earned under the 
former defined benefit plan were each reduced to their present value and contributed to each of 
the employees‘ accounts; this was their 1998 opening balance. Further, the new plan also 
provided a guarantee that an employee would, upon retirement, receive the greater of the amount 
in his/her individual account or the benefit he/she was entitled to as of January 1, 1998 (CIGNA 
Corp. v. Amara, 2011). 
For example, an employee aged 40 with ten years of service would have 50 service points. If the employee earning 
$60,000 in a particular year and had a Social Security integration level of $43,500 then the employee would receive 
a pay credit of $3,247.50 (5% of $43,500 plus 6.5% of $16,500) (Source: Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008) 
 
b. Outline of the Cash Balance Plan & Comparison with the Defined Benefit Plan 
 
CIGNA‘s Qualified Plan adjustment in 1998 represented a conversion from a traditional 
defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan. The cash balance design is considered a hybrid plan 
because it possesses elements characteristic of both defined benefit and defined contribution 
plans. CIGNA‘s cash balance plan design provides the participant a benefit based upon the 
balance of a hypothetical account attributed to the participant as an individual—a characteristic 
which bears a resemblance to the defined contribution plan design. Unlike the defined 
Table 1: Credit Rates for CIGNA‘s 1998 Cash Balance Plan 
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contribution plan, the individual account is granted pay credits rather than an actual cash 
allocation.  The account is granted pay credits based upon a percentage of the participant‘s 
compensation.  In the case of CIGNA‘s new plan, participants received annual pay credits 
between 3% and 8.5% of the employee‘s salary depending upon age, length of service, and other 
factors. Along with these pay credits, cash balance plans also provide the participant with credits 
representing hypothetical interest that accrue even after a participant is no longer performing 
services for the employer. In the case of CIGNA‘s new plan, the participant‘s hypothetical 
account receives additional interest credits at a rate equal to the return on 5-year US treasury bills 
the previous November plus .25%—a variable interest rate. CIGNA‘s plan also stated that this 
interest credit rate, given the variability of US treasury bills, could not earn less than 4.5% and 
could not earn more than 9% (Brown, 2011 p. 37-39).  
Compared to traditional defined benefit plans, cash balance plans have a more front-
loaded accrual: assuming the same final benefit at retirement under both plans, a participant 
under a defined benefit plan will earn a majority of his/her benefit within the few years 
immediately before retirement whereas a participant under a cash balance plan will earn a 
majority of their benefit over a much broader time period. The front-loaded nature of a cash 
balance plan‘s accrual also means that a participant under a cash balance plan will earn greater 
benefits in their first years of enrollment than they would have under a defined benefit plan 
assuming the end benefit was the same. This means that any fully vested participant who 
terminates employment early will have earned a significantly larger amount under the cash 
balance plan than they would have under a defined benefit plan (this is still assuming that both of 
these plans ultimately provide the same benefit to participants after the same number of years of 
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service). This makes the cash balance design particularly attractive to employees in an industry 
with relatively high turnover—changing jobs often does not eliminate nearly as much potential 
benefit accrual as it would if the industry were dominated by traditional defined benefit plans. 
Conversely, this high-turnover scenario would be less desirable to the employer because earlier 
termination represents a much greater cost to the employer than it would have under a defined 
benefit plan (Brown, 2011 p. 37-39). In CIGNA‘s case, there was a disparity in the pay-credit 
rate that granted a greater percentage to an employee of higher age and/or length of service. This 
permitted disparity offsets the front-loaded aspect of their cash balance plan in order to provide 
an increasing accrual rate overtime (41).  
c. CIGNA‘s conversion procedures 
 
In order to execute the conversion from a defined benefit to a cash balance plan CIGNA 
signed a plan amendment to freeze the benefit accruals of all Tier 2 employees and Tier 1 
employees with age plus years of credited service less than 45. The Tier 1 employees with age 
plus years of service greater than 45 were ―grandfathered‖ into the new plan under the same 
benefit accrual method and formula used in their old defined benefit plan (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 
2008). Because Tier 1 employees by definition had been employed by CIGNA for at least ten 
years at the time of the defined benefit plan conversion, this means that every Tier 1 employee 
older than 35 years of age retained their previous defined benefit accrual formula as well as their 
other benefits under the old plan; every other participant and subsequent new participants began 
to accrue retirement benefits under the provisions and formulas of the new cash balance plan.   
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The method from which CIGNA chose to convert their participant‘s defined benefit 
accruals into cash balance plan credits was to establish an ―initial opening balance‖ which would 
accumulate subsequent annual credits. This conversion is performed by establishing the present 
value of the participant‘s accrued normal retirement benefits using mortality and interest 
assumptions (Brown, 2011 p. 43-44).  Prior to the Pension Protection Act of 2006‘s explicit 
establishment of guidelines concerning this conversion, ERISA had no provisions that 
established any discount rate to use in order to determine present value for this purpose (Sunder 
v. U.S. Bancorp Pension Plan, 2009). One of CIGNA‘s consultants advised the company that 
opening balances ―could even be zero if you wanted‖ and that the September 2000 General 
Accounting Office Report stated ―current federal law does not govern how plan sponsors set 
opening hypothetical account balances for cash balance plans, provided that a plan ensures that 
participants do not receive less than the present value of prior accrued benefits if they separate 
from the employer‖ (General Accounting Office, 2000).   
CIGNA calculated the converted participant‘s initial balance by taking their accrued 
annual benefit at normal retirement age and determining the actuarial present value of the benefit 
based on a 6.05% interest rate and a 1983 (unisex) Group Annuity Morality Table or ―GATT 
Table‖. This table discounts the retirement benefit given the likelihood that the participant dies 
sometime between his/her current age and the normal retirement age of 65. Because the table 
was used to make a one-time discount instead of updating the balance as the likelihood of death 
during their employment diminishes, there was no way for participants to recoup this discount 
overtime. Tier 2 employees whose total age and years of service was greater than 55 had their 
interest rate adjusted to 5.05% and the accrual was discounted for present value with the 
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assumption that they would receive the accrual at age 62 instead of 65—this gave older or longer 
service employees a more favorable initial account balance (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008). 
CIGNA‘s post-1998 plan provision to contribute the present value of benefits already earned 
under the previous defined benefit plan was not necessary for compliance with the IRS given the 
fact that the provision to guarantee at least the benefit entitled to the participant as of January 1, 
1998 was sufficient to establish the plan‘s compliance to IRS Code §411(d)(6) and §204(g) of 
ERISA. These sections establish that a non-ESOP Qualified Plan is no longer in compliance with 
the IRS code if it is ever amended in such a fashion that any accrued benefits or optional forms 
of benefit are reduced or eliminated.  
d. The Necessity of Indexing a Future Benefit 
 
CIGNA‘s plan conversion resulted in benefit reductions that range from 30% to 50% of 
potential future benefit accruals (Amara v. Cigna, 2006). This can be explained by the fact that 
the conversion amendment ultimately adjusted the type of index to which a participant‘s final 
benefit was tied. Defined benefit plans generally base annual retirement benefits upon final pay 
or average final pay over a brief period of time before normal retirement age. This provision is 
perceived as a preventative measure to ensure that the future retirement benefit is not eroded by 
inflation overtime—a particularly deep concern for anyone that plans to save money. However, 
this is not a true protection from inflation because there is no guarantee that inflation will not 
exceed the rate of increase in a participant‘s pay. It is more accurate to describe the provision as 
a way to index the participant‘s benefit to the participant‘s rising standard of living. This 
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assumes that the participant‘s salary always increases, a plan may also provide a benefit based on 
their highest annual salary or an average of their highest paying years. (Brown, 2011 p. 3).  
If the benefit is not tied to final pay but instead indexed to the employee‘s average pay 
over their career then there is a significantly weaker link between retirement benefits and the 
participant‘s steadily increasing standard of living or national inflation. A career average benefits 
index would be a lot less valuable to a younger employee that works under the same plan until 
retirement—his/her pay may have increased dramatically but a defined benefit plan accrual 
defined under these terms would average it out. This is why most defined benefit plans index the 
accrued benefit to final pay during years of service (Brown, 2011 p. 3).  
The act of converting a defined benefit plan to a cash balance plans has been described as 
a method for businesses with a defined benefit plan to reduce future accrued benefits for 
employees by effectively adjusting the prior plan‘s annual benefit to a much lower benefit.  One 
of the ways this adjustment is made is by adjusting the disposition of the salary that the 
retirement benefit is based off. This adjustment is from years when the employee received their 
highest salaries (DB) to the average salary over their career (cash balance). This is because each 
credit to a participant in a cash balance plan is made on an annual basis and is based upon their 
compensation and compounded by the interest credit, often indexed against the interest rate on 
treasury bills (Lofgren, 1986).  
e. Wear-away 
 
A controversial technical aspect concerning the conversion of a defined benefit plan to a 
cash balance plan is the concept of ―wear-away‖.  Wear-away occurs when a participant in a 
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cash balance plan does not accrue any additional benefits for retirement despite the fact that they 
are earning credits and accruing interest credit on their account. This credit/benefit disparity 
arises when a participant‘s initial account balance on the cash balance plan is computed by 
discounting the participant‘s earned future annuity into a lump sum using an interest rate higher 
than the IRC §417(e)(3) rate. This makes the participant‘s opening account balance less than the 
present value of the participant‘s benefit already accrued under the defined benefit plan (Brown, 
2011 p. 57). The April 13, 1998 issue of Pension and Benefits Week states that ―[t]he interest 
rate used under Code Sec. 417(e)(3) is the annual rate on 30-year Treasury securities for the 
month before the date of distribution or any other time as prescribed by regulation‖ (―IRS regs 
conclusion‖, 1998). Another way that wear-away occurs is when the proper IRC §417(e)(3) 
interest rate is applied to calculate the lump sum but the discounting does not begin at the 
participant‘s early retirement benefit—the participant‘s initial balance does not take into account 
the value of the early retirement subsidy (Brown, 2011 p. 57).  
The IRS has endorsed and not explicitly prohibited wear-away. This concept does not 
violate ERISA §204(g) prohibiting amendments that allow accrued benefits or optional forms of 
benefit to be reduced or eliminated because the concept by definition indicates that an already 
accrued benefit has not been reduced or eliminated. Plan language that guarantees the participant 
receives the greater of his/her accrued defined benefit under a previous plan or account balance 
under cash balance plan is sufficient to indicate to the participant and to the IRS that an accrued 
benefit has not been reduced. Previous permutations of wear-away have already been approved 
by the IRS as an acceptable method employers could use to change the terms of their defined 
benefit plan. This concept previously applied to a change in actuarial factors wherein a period of 
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wear-away resulted from the fact that the benefit accrued under the previous actuarial factors was 
greater. Another instance of the IRS‘ endorsement of wear-away was after the enactment of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 where most defined benefit plans at the time were required to change 
some elements of their plan formula or design. To assist employers, the regulations described 
three approaches that employers could use to transition the defined benefit plans into compliance 
with the new law. The three different pre-approved methods were described as ―fresh start 
without wear-away‖, ―fresh start with wear-away‖, and ―fresh start with extended wear-away‖. 
In a generic sense, when a plan has a provision that includes a minimum benefit formula that is a 
fixed dollar amount or fixed percentage of compensation and a participant in that plan has 
greater minimum benefits than he does benefits under the increasing accruals of the plan‘s main 
benefit formula, that participant is experiencing wear-away (Brown, 2011 p. 57-58). CIGNA‘s 
use of interest rates higher than the return on 5-year treasury bills from the previous November 
and the irrecoverable mortality discount on calculating initial account balance made their plan 
participants experience wear away on their benefits. 
Documents for participants disclosing CIGNA‘s conversion from a defined benefit plan 
to a cash balance plan were distributed on December 1997.  Four versions of this disclosure were 
distributed to four different types of participants—those switching to the cash balance plan, those 
who maintained the provisions under the previous defined benefit plan, and those that did either 
and also participated in CIGNA‘s supplemental pension plan. These disclosures included details 
on how the defined benefit accrual was converted into an initial balance on the individual‘s cash 
balance plan account—present value of the annuity benefit assuming a 6.5% interest rate, 5.5% 
interest rate and briefer period for participants with greater than 55 service credits, etc.— but did 
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not mention the pre-mortality discount that was applied. A heading in the statement asks the 
question ―Will my benefit be better under the new Retirement Plan?‖ which is answered by the 
statement that ―…exact comparisons of benefits that cover all possible outcomes are 
difficult…[the plan] tends to provide larger benefits for shorter-service employees and 
comparable benefits for longer-service employees…‖ The statement includes no discussion 
concerning the wear-away inflicted upon all participants caused by both the use of the GATT 
table to discount for mortality as well as higher assumed interest rates. The 1998 Summary Plan 
Description also did not explain wear-away but did mention the plan‘s minimum benefit rule 
(Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008). 
f. Claims Against CIGNA Regarding Age Discrimination 
 
Mrs. Amara filed a class action lawsuit against CIGNA Corp.  Their chief argument was 
that CIGNA‘s cash balance plan violated the age discrimination provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code (―IRC‖) and ERISA. IRC § 623(i)(1)(A) states that ―it shall be unlawful for an 
employer, an employment agency, a labor organization, or any combination thereof to establish 
or maintain an employee pension benefit plan which requires or permits in the case of a defined 
benefit plan, the cessation of an employee‘s benefit accrual, or the reduction of the rate of an 
employee‘s benefit accrual, because of age.‖ CIGNA‘s expert on retirement claimed that if the 
rate of interest accrual and accrual of pay credits does not violate age discrimination—older, 
longer-serving employees accrue the same or higher pay credits as younger and/or shorter-
serving employees. Further, participant‘s defined benefit accrual/initial cash balance conversion 
even granted a favorable rate to older/longer service participants. While CIGNA claims that the 
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rate of benefit accrual determines age discrimination, Amara‘s class contends that the ultimate 
benefit upon retirement determines whether a Qualified Plan is committing age discrimination. 
Their retirement expert stated that a younger worker would receive a greater annuity upon 
retirement than a similarly situated older worker with the same service record and compensation 
because the younger worker would receive more annual account credits and benefit from 
compound interest (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008). A United States 7th Circuit Court of Appeals 
judge stated in Kathi Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan that the plaintiff‘s argument ―treats 
the time value of money as age discrimination‖ and that when an accrued benefit is properly 
discounted for time value the interest credit benefit disappears (Kathi Cooper v. IBM Personal 
Pension Plan, 2006). The Amara v. CIGNA court of 2008 agreed with this sentiment and ruled 
that CIGNA‘s cash balance plan is not age discriminatory. It also addressed the plaintiff‘s 
argument that the degree of wear-away for older participants was far greater than it was for 
younger participants. The plaintiff cited the fact that the calculation of initial account balance did 
not take into account the early retirement benefits. CIGNA‘s experts testified that wear away was 
principally driven by the fall of interest rates during the time the initial account was calculated 
(Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008). The court also agreed with the District of Connecticut judge in 
Custer v. Southern New England Telephone Company that ―The ‗wear-away‘ period is not 
necessarily longer for older workers; it is longer for workers that have greater frozen benefits. 
Under the old plan, the size of a worker's frozen benefits is a function of a worker's salary and 
years of service, not his age… Because a workers' [sic] frozen benefits are not a function of the 
worker's age, the size of the ‗wear-away effect‘ is not a function of the worker's age‖ (Custer v. 
S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 2008). The plaintiff‘s expert conceded that the GATT table discount 
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created greater wear-away for younger participant‘s than older. The Amara v. Cigna Corp court 
concluded that the plaintiff‘s charge of age discrimination was simply based of their perception 
of a plan‘s transition from a plan that heavily favored older, longer-service participants to a plan 
that was still favored older, longer-service participants ―but less so‖ (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 
2008). 
g. CIGNA‘s Denial of Liability 
 
The plaintiffs in Amara v. Cigna Corp. also claim that CIGNA did not provide required 
disclosures to employees and that the disclosures CIGNA provided did not meet the statutory 
standards under ERISA. CIGNA, however, claimed that the plaintiffs had not sued the right 
defendant with respect to these claims. They argued that the plaintiff‘s failure to name the plan 
administrator (see Appendix B) as a defendant—in addition to CIGNA and the CIGNA pension 
plan—preempts their claims regarding plan documents and disclosures because only the plan 
administrator is liable for any defects in notices and disclosure that are required for Qualified 
Plans under ERISA. The court acknowledged that this facet of ERISA law remains relatively 
unclear, even in case law. The aforementioned Custer v. Southern New England Telephone 
Company only named the plan and the employer as defendants but had not discussed the 
possibility that only the plan administrator could have been held liable for failures within the 
plan document and disclosures. In Richards v. Fleetboston Financial Corp. (427 F. Supp. 2d 
150), the court dismissed claims against the employer when relief was requested under ERISA 
§502(a)(1)(b) allowing civil action to be brought ―to recover benefits due to him under the terms 
of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future 
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benefits under the terms of the plan‖ but allowed claims against the employer when relief was 
requested under ERISA §502(a)(3) allowing civil action to be brought ―by a participant, 
beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of 
[ERISA] formally ―this subchapter‖ or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate 
equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of [ERISA] same or 
the terms of the plan‖. This case distinguishes under what statutory sections of ERISA the 
participant could seek relief from the employer but does not establish whether the plan 
administrator could be the sole person held liable for defects in required notices and disclosures 
(Amara v. CIGNA Corp., 2008).  
The only defendants named in this case were CIGNA and the CIGNA Pension Plan. 
CIGNA‘s claim that the plan administrator is the only person liable for defects in required 
disclosure is based on explicit language in ERISA that requires the plan administrator to provide 
these disclosures. The Second Circuit has previously permitted suits attempting to recover plan 
benefits to proceed against the administrator of the plan and/or the plan itself while limiting 
inadequate disclosure claims solely to the plan administrator (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008).  A 
US Second Circuit Court of Appeals claimed that ―ERISA undoubtedly requires that participants 
be told who has the financial obligation to fund the plans. But that obligation is placed on the 
person designated under ERISA as the ‗administrator‘ of the plan, not on every fiduciary‖ (Lee 
v. Burkhart, 1993). Also, a US Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals claimed that  
―Western General, the only defendant, cannot be held liable for any inaccuracies in the 
SPD. Congress has explicitly provided that the responsibility for complying with these 
statutory requirements falls on the plan administrator. The case law also confirms that 
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any cause of action for violations of these disclosure requirements is proper only against 
the plan administrator, the party responsible under the statute‖ (Klosterman v. Western 
General Management, 1994).  
Amara‘s class responded to CIGNA‘s arguement by stating that the two plan administrators were 
not effectively designated to be plan administrators by CIGNA—making CIGNA the plan 
administrator by default—and that even if he was a valid plan administrator the effective control 
over the content and delivery of the defective plan documents and disclosures remained with 
CIGNA and therefore CIGNA should be held liable for these defects. The plaintiffs claimed that 
CIGNA had not effectively established a plan administrator because—citing U.S.C. 
§1002(16)(A) that a plan ―administrator‖ is the plan sponsor if an administrator is not designated 
under the terms of the plan—the cash balance plan document did not designate any named 
individual as plan administrator. However, the Code of Federal Regulations title 26 §1.414(g)-
1(a) states that a plan document may designate a plan administrator ―[b]y reference to a 
procedure established under the terms of the instrument pursuant to which a plan administrator is 
designated‖. The Amara v. CIGNA Corp. court found that CIGNA‘s plan used this method—
Article XIII called ―Plan Administration‖ states: ―[t]he [Corporate Benefit Plan] Committee shall 
delegate to a Plan Administrator the duties, authority and functions set forth in this Article XIII‖ 
and that ―[t]he Plan Administrator shall perform all such duties as are necessary to operate, 
administer and manage the Plan in accordance with … its terms…‖. The court rejected the 
plaintiff‘s argument claiming that the plan administrator was not validly appointed but agreed 
with the plaintiff‘s claim that CIGNA should be treated as the effective administrator of the Plan 
for purposes of the defective disclosures. This was because CIGNA alone prepared and 
  23 
published the disclosures—the plan administrator was so peripheral that he was not even on 
CIGNA‘s list of likely witnesses at trial. Instead, a former Vice President was chosen to testify 
regarding ―[c]communications about the conversion to [the cash balance plan] and the operation 
of [the cash balance plan]‖. Additionally, the initial newsletter sent to participants announcing 
the plan conversion entitled ―Introducing Your New Retirement Program‖ was published by 
CIGNA Benefits Communications, the plan administrator‘s name was not mentioned anywhere 
in the newsletter, and the newsletter informs readers, ―If you have questions, please e-mail your 
questions to Signature Benefits Services…or you may call Signature Benefits Services…‖. There 
was no indication that the plan administrator was in any way involved in the preparation or 
dissemination of the Summary Plan Descriptions though these were in fact the first documents 
that indicated to participants that they should contacts the plan administrator regarding any 
questions they have concerning the new plan. The Amara v. CIGNA Corp. court also found that 
it appeared that CIGNA as an entity—rather than the plan administrator—sought out William 
Mercer—a consulting firm—for assistance in preparing the required disclosures for their plan 
transition. CIGNA argued that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had previously held in 
Crocco v. Xerox that lawsuits to recover benefits under §502(a)(1)(B) (see above) can only be 
against ―the plan administrators and trustees of the plan in their capacity as such‖ and that an 
employer may not be considered a de fact co-administrator of a plan qualified under ERISA. The 
Amara v. CIGNA Corp. court felt that Crocco was judged a case with circumstances disparate 
from the CIGNA case. Crocco involved a participant‘s claim for plan benefits that the plan 
administrator herself denied—the company was in no way involved other than in its capacity as 
the employer of the plan administrator. In Amara‘s case the employer, not even the plan 
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administrator, possessed full control over the processes alleged to have violated ERISA—the 
issuance of notices and disclosures are qualitatively different than a plan administrator‘s denial 
of a participant‘s claim to plan benefits. Despite this, the plain language of Crocco‘s judgment 
prevented the Amara v. CIGNA Corp. court from finding CIGNA liable for inadequate 
disclosures under 502(a)(1)(B) even if they are considered the effective co-administrator of their 
cash balance plan. However, this did not exempt them from being liable for claims against an 
employer on behalf of the plan for a breach of fiduciary (see Appendix B) duty under §502(a)(2) 
or claims for injunctive or other equitable relief under §502(a)(3) and the court held that the 
plaintiffs were permitted to pursue their defective disclosure claims against CIGNA under the 
latter statute (Amara v. Cigna Corp, 2008).  
h. Overview of ERISA‘s Required Disclosures to Participants 
SPD & SMM 
 
ERISA requires Qualified Plans to disclose key information about the plan and its 
operation to participants and their beneficiaries; employers that are not in compliance with these 
disclosure requirements may face penalties. The following documents are required to be 
distributed to participants and beneficiaries: (1) the summary annual report, (2) the summary 
plan description (―SPD‖), (3) the summary of material modification (―SMM‖), (4) a statements 
of benefits to terminated vested employees, and (5) a notice of failure to meet minimum funding 
standards. The Department of Labor suggests these disclosures be distributed in-hand to an 
employee at his/her worksite—it is not acceptable to merely place the materials at a location 
frequented by the plan participants. It is permitted for the employer to distribute required 
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disclosures in a periodical that is distributed to employees (e.g. a publication in a union 
newspaper or a company publication) provided that distribution is all-inclusive and a clear notice 
on the front page informs readers that the publication contains important information about the 
rights granted under the plan and ERISA and should be read and kept for future reference. 
Because participants and beneficiaries may not receive these periodicals, they often must be 
supplemented by other authorized distribution methods calculated to ensure actual receipt 
(Kushner, 2011 p. 57).  
A Summary Plan Description (―SPD‖) is a written summary of the Qualified Plan‘s 
contents; DOL regulations specify its required contents. ERISA requires that the SPD be written 
with the intent to be easily understood by the participant or beneficiary. It must be accurate and 
comprehensively explain to the participants their obligations and rights under the plan. The SPD 
must also include clarifying examples and illustrations of the more complex aspects within the 
Qualified Plan. The SPD should never be contradictory to the language within the plan 
document: a disclaimer is typically included in an SPD stating that the terms of the plan 
document will govern in the event of a contradiction but courts have been known to hold the 
employer accountable for SPD language regardless of this disclaimer. There are no monetary 
penalties for a failure to distribute an SPD per se; there are no monetary penalties for any 
technical violations of ERISA within the SPD per se. However, there are penalties imposed for 
either of these violations of ERISA if they are under exceptional circumstances such as bad faith, 
active concealment, or fraud—ERISA does not provide applicable remedies for these violations 
(59-60). Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations §2520.102-2(a) states that the format of the 
SPD must not have the effect of ―misleading, misinforming, or failing to inform participants and 
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beneficiaries‖ and that ―[a]ny description of exception, limitations, reductions, and other 
restrictions of plan benefits shall not be minimized, rendered obscure, or otherwise made to 
appear unimportant‖. Further, ―[t]he advantages and disadvantages of the plan shall be presented 
without either exaggerating the benefits or minimizing the limitations‖. A different SPD for each 
group/class of participants under the plan is permitted. An SPD must be distributed to 
participants and beneficiaries within 120 days of the date the plan becomes subject to ERISA‘s 
reporting and disclosure requirements—this is the first day that an employee is credited with an 
hour of service under the plan, the effective date of a plan implemented prospectively, or the 
SPD must be distributed within 120 days beginning the day after the adoption date of a plan 
implemented retrospectively. It must also be distributed to a new participant within 90 days after 
he/she becomes a participant and it must be distributed to a beneficiary within 90 days after 
he/she first receives benefits form the plan. An updated SPD must be prepared and distributed 
every 5 years if there have been any amendments to the plan within this time period and a 
restated SPD must be prepared and distributed every ten years even if no amendments have been 
made within the past ten years (62-64).  
The SPD must include:  
1. The plan name 
2. The names and addresses of the employer or the employee organization 
3. The plan year 
4. The list of plan sponsors 
5. The EIN and plan number 
6. The plan type 
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7. How the plan is administered 
8. Requirements for eligibility 
9. The circumstances resulting in the disqualification of benefits 
10. Collective bargaining agreements (if applicable) 
11. A statements of the participant‘s rights under ERISA 
12. A summary of the employer‘s authority to terminate or amend the plan 
13. A summary of any plan provisions governing the allocation and disposition of plan assets 
upon termination 
14. Fees and charges 
15. The claims procedure 
16. Normal retirement age under the plan 
17. Any rights to self-direct investments 
18. Joint and survivor benefits 
19. The plan‘s procedures governing Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (―QDRO‖; see 
Appendix B) 
20. How the plan calculates years of service 
21. Disclosure regarding—upon a plan merger—any rights under both the successor plan and 
the former merged plan 
With respect to the type of plan that must be described, examples of a plan "type‖ include a 
profit sharing plan, a cash balance plan, a defined benefit plan, etc. In describing the plan type 
the SPD must also illustrate the means by which the plan accumulates funds to pay benefits. The 
SPD must also explain the sources of contributions to the plan—employer contributions, 
  28 
employee contributions, matching contributions—and the methods used to calculate the amount 
of the contributions (64-66). 
When a material amendment or other change is made to a Qualified Plan subject to 
ERISA the plan sponsor must prepare and distribute a Summary of Material Modification 
(―SMM‖) which is an addendum to the plan‘s SPD. A restated SPD that includes the necessary 
amendatory information would also satisfy this requirement. According to the DOL regulation 
§2520.104b-3(a) the SMM must be distributed to all participants and beneficiaries receiving 
benefits under the plan within 210 days after the end of the plan year in which the modification 
was adopted. The SMM must also be distributed to new participants within 90 days of the date 
they become participants. The SMM must be prepared in a manner intended to be understood by 
the average plan participant. The general format and distribution requirements of an SMM are 
the same as they are in an SPD (68).  
204(h) Notice 
 
For defined benefit plans ERISA §204(h) requires advanced disclosure of amendments 
that would significantly reduce the rate of future benefit accrual. This requirement also applies to 
an individual account plan subject to minimum funding standards—this includes cash balance 
plans. Because an amendment that reduces early retirement benefits or reduces a retirement-type 
subsidy is technically treated as reducing future benefit accruals, these amendments by the 
employer would also require the distribution of a notice to maintain compliance with ERISA 
§204(h). An amendment that reduces early retirement benefits or retirement-type subsidies is not 
considered significant if the amendment is intended to be a reduction of benefits that would 
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otherwise create significant burdens for the plan and participants unless the amendment 
adversely affects participant‘s rights in a greater than minimal degree (72). If the §204(h) notice 
is not required to be distributed to an employee or alternate payee (see Appendix B) at the time 
of the amendment, the notice is never required to be provided even if their benefits end up being 
reduced by the amendment at some point of time in the future (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2011). A 
notice intended to remain in compliance with ERISA §204(h) must be distributed within a 
reasonable time before the amendment‘s effective date. It must be distributed to each participant, 
each beneficiary that is an alternate payee under a QDRO, each employee organization that is 
representing the participant in the plan, and each employer with an obligation to contribute to the 
plan. This notice must also be expressed in a manner wherein it can be understood by the average 
plan participant. It must also contain enough information to allow participants to understand the 
effect the amendment has upon their benefits. A failure to provide this disclosure will result in an 
excise tax and an egregious failure to provide this disclosure will result in an invalidation of the 
amendment for individuals that would receive greater benefits under the plan if the amendment 
had not occurred. A failure to provide the disclosure is egregious if it is within the control of the 
plan sponsor and is an intentional failure. The failure is also egregious if it fails to provide most 
individuals with most of the information they are entitled to receive. An intentional failure can 
include any failure to provide the notice after the plan administrator discovers the unintentional 
failure. If the notice is for a defined benefit plan the notice must compare the value of the annual 
benefit starting at normal retirement age under the amended plan with the value of this benefit 
prior to the plan amendment. For an individual account plan subject to minimum funding 
standards the value of benefit to be allocated to the participant‘s account in the future under the 
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amended plan must be compared with this sort of future allocation as it would have occurred 
under the plan had it not been amended. If the amendment is intended to simply comply with 
changes in applicable law then the IRS may waive the §204(h) notice requirement on a case-by-
case basis. The 204(h) notice must be prepared for: 
1. Participants or alternate payees whose rate of future benefit accrual is reasonably 
expected to be significantly less than it was prior to the amendment. 
2. Employee organizations that represent at least two participants entitled to receive the 
notice. 
3. All employers obligated to contribute to the plan. 
4. The individuals that are reasonably expected to become participants or alternate 
payees (Kushner, 2011 p. 72-76). 
The notice generally must be provided at least 45 days before the amendment‘s effective 
date and at least 15 days if there are less than 100 participants with accrued benefits. The 204(h) 
notice must be distributed even if the participant can choose between a benefit formula in effect 
before the amendment and a benefit formula in effect after the amendment. The notice must be 
written in a fashion calculated to be understood by the average participant and include enough 
information to allow participants to understand the impact of the plan amendment. The 204(h) 
notice must also express to the reader the significance of the information it is intended to discuss. 
It must also not contain information that could be considered materially false or misleading; it 
must not omit information that would cause the included information to be misleading. The 
notice must be in narrative form, include the effective date, and describe the benefit allocation 
prior to the amendment‘s effective date as well as the benefit allocation after the amendment‘s 
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effective date. If the amendment reduces an early retirement benefit or retirement-type subsidy 
then the notice must also provide the same type of before/after explanation. The notice must also 
provide enough information wherein the reader understands the approximate magnitude of the 
expected future benefit accrual reduction. Examples must be included because it is unreasonable 
to expect that the recipient would understand the approximate magnitude of reduction simply 
based on a description of the amendment (Kushner, 2011 p. 72-76) However, according an 
Internal Revenue Service treasury regulations 1.411(d)-6 Q&A, ―[t]he summary need not explain 
how the individual benefit of each participant or alternate payee will be affected by the 
amendment‖. 
i. Claims Against CIGNA Regarding Inadequate and Misleading Disclosure 
The 204(h) Notice & Wear-away 
 
The plaintiffs in Amara v. Cigna Corp. claimed that CIGNA, as plan administrator, did 
not comply with ERISA‘s statutory and regulatory notice requirements. They claimed that the 
disclosures included defects in form as well as substance and argue that as a result some aspects 
of the new cash balance plan were invalid.  They also claim that the reason CIGNA provided 
inadequate notices and disclosures was because they were attempting to intentionally avoid 
negative employee reactions to the new cash balance plan. CIGNA asserted that it provided all 
required disclosures and that they were not materially misleading. The specific publications were 
a November 1997 Signature Benefits Newsletter that CIGNA identified as a §204(h) notice, the 
December 1997 Retirement Program Information Kit that CIGNA identified as a Summary of 
Material Modification, the October 1998 Summary Plan Description for the new cash balance 
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plan, and the September 1999 Summary Plan Description for the cash balance plan. The 
plaintiff‘s claim against the §204(h) notice was that it was deficient because it failed to inform 
participants that there was a significant reduction in the rate of future benefit accrual due to the 
conversion from the defined benefit plan to the cash balance plan.  They also claim that the 
Summary Plan Descriptions and the Summary of Material Modification were not adequate 
because they did not inform participants about the potential of accrued benefit wear-away and 
that benefits accrued under the defined benefit plan may not have been fully protected.  
The required content of the §204(h) notice as it existed prior to 2001 required only a 
summary of the amendment and the effective date. It was also permissible to substitute the 
amendment‘s summary with the actual text of the amendment so long as it was written to be 
understood by the average participant. CIGNA argued that the need for a §204(h) notice was not 
required because the new cash balance plan did not cause a significant reduction in participants‘ 
benefit accrual. This is because the accrual of benefits under the defined benefit plan were frozen 
since December 31, 1997 and the cash balance plan was not established under December 21, 
1998—the notice regarding the freeze—the §204(h) notice—was provided in the November 
1997 Newsletter. They argue that no subsequent notice was necessary despite the 
implementation of the new cash balance plan because any future accrual under the cash balance 
plan was necessarily the same or greater than the participants‘ lack of accrual under the freeze. 
The court did not find this argument persuasive despite the fact that the resumption of benefit 
accrual after the freeze would normally cause an increase, rather than a decrease in participants‘ 
accrual. This is because the freeze was simply an interim phase—CIGNA always intended to 
establish the cash balance plan subsequently. The newsletter that CIGNA claimed was intended 
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to comply with 204(h) requirements even stated that the freeze was only an interim stopgap for 
the new retirement program—the first line of this newsletter reads, ―On January 1, 1998, CIGNA 
will introduce a new retirement program‖ and it later states that CIGNA will ―formally adopt‖ 
the new retirement plan on April 1998, retroactive to January 1, 1998. With respect to the initial 
account balance CIGNA merely states in this newsletter that, ―Once [opening] balances are 
calculated, they will be credited to Retirement Plan accounts retroactively to January 1, 1998, so 
you won‘t lose any interest credits for the first part of 1998‖ (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008). In a 
different case in the same district the judge noted that ―[i]t is not so obvious to this Court that 
when there is a freeze in benefits, along with the promise of retroactive benefit accruals once the 
new Plan is adopted, any additional benefit accruals at all constitute an overall increase because 
the baseline is zero‖ (Brody v. Enhance Reinsurance Co. Pension Plan, 2003). The Amara v. 
Cigna court related this position for its applicability to ERISA‘s notice requirements because the 
court considered this portion of ERISA‘s purpose to be to ―protect employees‘ interests and their 
reasonable expectations‖. They felt that if employers were permitted to avoid proper notice 
requirements simply by exploiting the technicality of freezing previous plan benefits before 
instituting new ones retroactively then they would be effectively permitted to perform an activity 
that runs diametrically opposite the legislative intent of ERISA‘s disclosure requirements 
(Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008). 
CIGNA also claimed that the §204(h) notice was not required because the cash balance 
plan was implemented retroactively—the notice was legally intended to provide a warning to 
participants regarding prospective changes to their retirement plan. The §204(h) statute requires 
that the notice be published and distributed ―after the adoption of the plan amendment and not 
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less than 15 days before the effective date of the plan amendment‖. They argued that literal 
compliance with this statute in the case of a retroactive amendment would be difficult, if not 
impossible. The court disagreed with this notion that the retroactivity of the amendment 
instituting a cash balance plan invalidates the requirement to distribute a §204(h) notice. It felt 
that the primary purpose of the §204(h) notice was to provide employees with the opportunity to 
understand the changes being made to their retirement plan and to possibly protest or otherwise 
seek to alter these changes if they happen to be unacceptable. It also felt that if CIGNA had 
provided notice before the retroactive implementation of the cash balance plan then the 
participants would have had advance notice of the changes—ERISA‘s intent regarding 
disclosure. The Amara v. CIGNA Corp. court found that the retroactive nature of the cash 
balance plan‘s adoption alone was not a sufficient reason to void ERISA‘s requirements to issue 
a §204(h) notice (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008).  
The court compared the future potential benefit accruals under the defined benefit plan 
with the future potential benefit accruals under the cash balance plan and found that a significant 
reduction had occurred. CIGNA itself admitted that if they had ―never adopted the cash balance 
plan…[participants] would have a larger benefit than they have under th[e] conversion‖. The 
plaintiffs‘ expert testified that switching from the defined benefit plan with accruals indexed to 
final or highest average salary to a formula that results in being tied to career average pay will be 
almost guaranteed to cause a substantial reduction in future accrued benefits. This is generally 
true because employee salaries typically increase over time and switching from a final average to 
a career average will necessarily affect future benefit accrual negatively. It was estimated that the 
defined benefit plan accrual rate was 1.5% of the participant‘s highest compensation; the accrual 
  35 
rate under the cash balance plan, assuming a 4.5% annual salary increase, was approximately 
.75% of the participant‘s highest compensation. This would mean that CIGNA‘s new cash 
balance had opening account balances with potentially large periods of wear-away, significantly 
lower rate of accrual—when indexed based upon final pay—compared to the defined benefit 
plan and a lower interest-credit benefit accrual because the participant would receive fewer 
interest credits from having a lower and slower-growing corpus. For example, one participant at 
55 had a projected pension benefit of $1.8 million under the defined benefit plan assuming he 
had earned a salary that increased by 2% each year. The projected benefit of this participant at 55 
with a salary increase of 2% each year would been equal to $1 million under the cash balance 
plan. He had a 45% reduction in his benefits. Another participant, one of the few participants that 
had been shown an actual comparison of benefits found that even with an unrealistically high 
interest credit rate his future benefits were still 29% lower than those he would have received 
under the defined benefit plan; using a 5.8% interest credit rate his benefits were reduced by 
44%. The Amara v. Cigna Corp. court held that a 204(h) notice was required to be distributed to 
participants (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008). 
ERISA had not required certain elements of disclosure in §204(h) notices prior to 1998. 
Since 1998, disclosure of wear-away became a requirement. CIGNA argued that at the time the 
cash balance plan was established it was not required to explain the nature or extent of the 
reductions themselves or even make any indication that the notice was intended to comply with 
§204(h). The plaintiff asserted that these disclosures required a statement to the effect that ―your 
benefits may be reduced‖, that the statement given was not in compliance with Treasury 
Regulations 1.411(d)-6 in that it was not ―written in a manner calculated to be understood by the 
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average plan participant‖, that the statement should have included some explanation of wear-
away, and that the other ways in which benefits were reduced should have been disclosed. They 
argued that it was unrealistic for CIGNA to believe that a mere summary of the cash balance 
plan would be comprehensible without explicit acknowledgement of the potential for reductions 
and the various ways they might occur. The court held that even though the §204(h) statute had 
not required the additional information, CIGNA‘s was still in violation of §204(h) because they 
had avoided providing such information and they instead offered material misrepresentations 
suggesting that there had been benefit increases instead. The 2008 Amara v. Cigna Corp. court 
confirmed from the plaintiff‘s attorney that there was nothing in CIGNA‘s disclosures that would 
give anybody any the notion that they may be subject to wear-away. The court found that 
CIGNA offered statements that misled participants into believing that there would be no 
component of the new cash balance plan that would result in significant reductions in the rate of 
future benefit accruals. The 1997 notice stated that ―CIGNA will significantly enhance its 
retirement program‖ and that ―[o]ne advantage the company will not get from the retirement 
program changes is cost saving‖—nothing in this newsletter indicated that participants‘ rate of 
benefit accrual might decrease by a significant margin. This information was equally nonexistent 
in their other publications regarding the new Qualified Plan. One of its Q&As states that CIGNA 
―is not reducing the overall amount it contributes for retirement benefits, nor has the new 
program been designed to save money‖. This may me true: the contribution for retirement 
benefits, given the structure of a Qualified Plan subject to minimum funding standards, would 
only theoretically and not necessarily be reduced if there were a major decrease in future 
participants‘ benefit accrual. Further, CIGNA argued that this statement was not materially 
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misleading because they contributed to the 401(k) established alongside the cash balance plan 
and these contributions counterbalanced any savings they made from the implementation of the 
cash balance plan. The plaintiffs noted, however, that a portion of CIGNA‘s additional 
contributions to the 401(k) were solely discretionary on the part of the employer—they were 
allocated only to accounts chosen by CIGNA. The plaintiff‘s expert stated that the inclusion of a 
purported contribution offset to a separate 401(k) plan was not conducive to an accurate and 
informative disclosure in compliance with ERISA. Further, analysis by Mercer indicated that for 
benefits to be properly offset by contributions to the separate 401(k) plan CIGNA would have 
had to provide the maximum discretionary contribution each year and these investments would 
have had to earn a 9% return each year. CIGNA admitted that the Tier 1 employees with age plus 
years of service greater than 45 were ―grandfathered‖ into the new plan because ―[t]hese 
employees couldn‘t match this benefit growth under the new plan‖ but they reassured 
participants in their publications that ―[o]ther employees and all new hires will be able to earn 
comparable benefits as career employees under the CIGNA Retirement Plan‖. With respect to 
the participants that were hired before December 31, 1988 but did not accumulate enough 
age/service credits to have their old defined benefit plan formula grandfathered in under the new 
plan, CIGNA also stated in their disclosures, ―Our analysis showed that, in comparison to people 
with a higher age and service combination, you have plenty of time to take full advantage of the 
many attractive features of the Retirement Plan, plus you will have access to the new lump sum 
payment option‖. Later it says, ―The new Retirement Plan is different from the current Pension 
Plan, so exact comparisons of benefits that cover all possible outcomes are difficult. Generally 
speaking, the new Retirement Plan, in comparison with the current Pension Plan, tends to 
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provide larger benefits for shorter-service employees and comparable benefits for longer-service 
employees.‖ It also lauded the value of the lump-sum distribution option—a feature unavailable 
in the previous defined benefit plan—and reassured participants that ―[e]ach dollar‘s worth of 
credits is a dollar of retirement benefits payable to you after you are vested (see Appendix B). 
Under the plan, your benefit will grow steadily throughout your career as credits are added to 
your account.‖ The SPD contained similar statements.  CIGNA‘s retirement kit also included a 
statement assuring its employees that ―[t]he conversion factors we are using to determine your 
opening account balance are based on guidelines established by the government to ensure a fair 
transition for employees‖ and on their SPD it states, ―The conversion formula used is based on 
guidelines established by the federal government for valuing pension benefits‖. CIGNA admitted 
in court that these guidelines do not exist: citing a Government Accountability Office (―GAO‖) 
report on conversions from defined benefit to cash balance plan CIGNA stated that ―There is no 
provision of law that sets forth minimum requirements for determining opening balances.‖ 
CIGNA claimed that the disclosures it provided its participants regarding the opening account 
balances under the cash balance plan as well as subsequent account statements and compensation 
reports constituted adequate disclosure regarding all material aspects of the plan, thus any 
deficiencies in the initial plan notices were legally negligible. The court disagreed with CIGNA‘s 
claim that accurate and relevant disclosures negate the fact that they provided defective notices 
previously. It found that the volume of information they chose to disclose was not relevant to the 
matter; what was relevant was the statements made that were not written in a manner calculated 
to be understood by the average participant and failed to provide important details that 
reasonable employees would have wanted to know regarding the transition from a defined 
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benefit plan to a cash balance plan. The court found that CIGNA‘s adequate explanation of how 
opening account balances were established did not in of itself provide sufficient scrutable 
information concerning the transition and could not counteract the favorable impression on the 
new plan made by CIGNA‘s other statements concerning positive features and how participant‘s 
benefits will grow. This would not cure the substantial amount of misinformation contained in 
CIGNA‘s plan and amendment disclosures (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008). In a very similar 
case—what would become Lonecke v. Citigroup Pension Plan—the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York stated that the 
[p]laintiffs had every reason to expect that under the new cash balance plan, their pension 
would continue to accrue at a rate approved by congress. It therefore had every reason to 
expect that under the new cash balance plan, their pensions would continue to accrue at a 
rate approved by Congress. It therefore is immaterial that the December 1999 §204(h) 
notice stated in bolded font that the 2000 CBA could result in a reduction of their 
benefits. Given the material omissions, it remained ‗insufficiently accurate and 
comprehensive to reasonably apprise participants and beneficiaries of their rights‘‖ (In re 
Citigroup Pension, 2006).  
In another similar case another judge in the Southern District of New York stated that ―"A notice 
is intended to give fair warning, and fails to do so if it is cryptic, or requires research beyond the 
document itself" (Hirt v. Equitable Retirement Plan, 2006). 
CIGNA asked some of its managers to review the cash balance plan and they sent 
CIGNA a statement that recommended the employer ―[p]ublish case studies (positive and 
negative) and expect to be able to support employees who will be negatively impacted ASAP‖. 
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They also insisted CIGNA ―[s]how illustrations that ‗prove‘ small lump sums will yield 
equivalent benefits in the future (a lot of disbelief among managers about the way we handle 
data)‖ and that ―[g]eneral reaction to HR support is bad—too many examples of how poor the 
communications from HR have been in the past; low degree of reliance on information from the 
division‖. These suggestions were ignored by CIGNA. The employer provided a questionnaire 
attached to its December 1998 Retirement Kit asking, ―What additional information would you 
like CIGNA to provide?‖ responses included: ―More specific detail re: calculation of lump sum‖, 
―…plug in the individual employee‘s actual percentage, salary and points making the same 
general assumptions and project the retirement under the old and new plan‖, ―Comparison to old 
pension plan i.e. dollar amount i.e. would lump sum distribution buy an annuity comparable to 
old pension plan?‖. Despite these requests by employers and CIGNA‘s sufficient knowledge on 
the true effects on participants‘ rate of benefit accrual, the employer chose not to inform 
participants about these effects so they could, the Amara v. Cigna Corp. court claimed, ease the 
transition to a retirement plan that was less favorable than the previous defined benefit plan. 
CIGNA even explicitly instructed the consulting company that helped them produce the 1997 
Newsletter and 1998 Retirement Kit, ―not to compare the old to the new plans" in those two 
documents. A very similar request was made by the employer to their actuaries. CIGNA‘s 
assistant vice-president of global benefits wrote in an internal email that ―[w]e continue to focus 
on NOT providing employees before and after samples of the Pension Plan changes‖ and when 
one of the benefits counselors was requested to provide these comparisons the counselor replied 
―we don‘t do that‖. The plan administration at the time of the 2008 trial confirmed that ―as a 
general rule the policy was that employees would not be provided with comparisons between 
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their benefits under the old plan and the new plan.‖ CIGNA‘s presidents were responsible for the 
substantial shift of focus on positive aspects of the cash balance plan in their plan disclosures and 
they understood the risk of an adverse employee reaction if the true severity of reductions in the 
rate of future benefit accrual were known—in September 1998 several articles appeared on cash 
balance conversions at other companies and in some cases the complaints of employees resulted 
in a partial or complete rollback on their cash balance amendments. CIGNA avoided a similar 
revolt within their company—it was reported to the board of directors that ―CIGNA‘s Cash 
Balance plan has been very well received by CIGNA employees (employee survey ratings up 15 
percentage points) and has not generated notable controversy‖. The court concluded that CIGNA 
was aware of the significant rate of future benefit accrual, that it would affect a substantial 
proportion of its employees, and that it wished to avoid and negate adverse reactions from 
employees. This was the reason its §204(h) notice was not in compliance with ERISA. The court 
also found that the SMM and SPDs failed to disclose the possibility of wear-away. CIGNA 
admitted that it did not inform employees that they may not be accruing benefits under the cash 
balance plan but argued that disclosure on this wear-away concept was unnecessary. Their 
reasons for this claim are that the wear-away was an unpredictable ―idiosyncratic contingency‖, 
that the wear away was as a result of an accumulation of plan provisions as well as unpredictable 
circumstances such as the interest-credit Treasury bill index, and that the wear away only had the 
potential of affecting a small number of participants (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008). A second 
circuit judge had earlier ruled that an ERISA fiduciary was not required to be ―perfectly 
prescient as to all future changes in employee benefits‖ but also that ―when a plan administrator 
speaks, it must speak truthfully‖ (Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 1994). In Becker v. Eastman Kodak, 
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another second circuit judge claimed that ―an SPD need not anticipate every possible 
idiosyncratic contingency that might affect a particular participant‘s or beneficiary‘s status‖. This 
same judge took a narrow view of what constituted an ―idiosyncratic contingency‖—the judge 
equated it to the sudden death of the participant (Becker v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1997). The 
Amara v. Cigna Corp. court motioned that wear-away was a relevant structural phenomenon and 
that CIGNA predicted it despite the interactions of numerous plan provisions and falling interest 
rates. The rate at which opening account balances were determined, the use of a mortality 
discount, and the exclusion of early retirement benefits practically guaranteed that wear-away 
would occur if interest rates had fallen. Though CIGNA claimed that the rapid decline in interest 
rates following the implementation of the cash balance plan was entirely unexpected, interest 
rates had already fallen by 1% between 1997 and 1998—when CIGNA published the first part of 
the cash balance plan SPD. For this reason, the court found that CIGNA had a duty to alert 
participants of the possibility of wear-away in its disclosures regarding the cash balance plan. 
The fact that CIGNA created a Qualified Plan that was structurally susceptible to wear-away 
alone created the responsibility to produce disclosures on wear-away. Also, the court disagreed 
with CIGNA‘s claim that wear-away only had the potential of affecting a small number of 
participants because it understood that wear-away had a dramatic effect on even just the 
plaintiffs alone—some had no benefit accrual from the implementation of the cash balance plan 
all the way up to their retirement. The court found that CIGNA‘s disclosures were not only 
insufficient but also misleading. The 1997 Newsletter stated that after establishing an opening 
account balance that the participant ―will begin earning retirement benefits‖. Its 1998 SPD stated 
that the individual participant account and credit system would grant the participant the ―ability 
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to earn retirement benefits throughout [the participants‘] career‖. In another portion of the SPD it 
states that ―[u]nder the plan, your benefit will grow steadily throughout your career as credits are 
added to your account‖. To this conclusion, CIGNA argued that ―the fact that the SPD told Plan 
participants that they might receive their protected Minimum Benefit if it was higher than their 
cash balance benefit was a clear indication that a participant‘s prior protected benefit might be 
greater than his or her account balance, and that there might be a period of time during which 
there would be no increase in his or her overall pension benefit‖. The court disagreed with 
CIGNA‘s contention that the participants received the required degree of notice concerning 
wear-away because nowhere else in the notices is wear-away, or any equivalent phenomena, 
given any further discussion. Given the fact that the aforementioned statements in CIGNA‘s 
disclosures unequivocally state that all participants will begin accruing benefits under the cash 
balance plan starting January 1, 1998, the court found that participants would reasonably believe 
that wear away was not an element of the cash balance plan—there was no statement in the 
notices that informed any participants of the possibility that they were not earning retirement 
benefits. This indirect reference to wear-away was inadequate (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008). 
Early Retirement Benefits; Annuity & Lump Sum Distributions 
 
Another argument by the plaintiff against CIGNA‘s disclosures was that they led 
participants to believe that their accrued benefits under the cash balance plan were protected, 
particularly early retirement benefits. The disclosure stated that if former participants under the 
defined benefit plan chose an annuity distribution under the cash balance plan then they would 
receive all of their early retirement benefits. However, the early retirement benefits were 
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excluded from the lump sum distribution because they were excluded from the calculation of 
opening account balances. CIGNA‘s disclosures gave participants the reasonable impression that 
their early retirement benefits were fully protected as part of either their minimum benefit or 
their initial account balance under the cash balance plan. The November 1997 newsletter stated 
that ―[i]f you earned a benefit under the current Pension Plan, the lump sum value of that benefit 
as of December 31, 1997 will be transferred to your account as your opening balance‖ and the 
December 1997 Retirement Kit stated that ―[a]ny benefits that you have earned under the 
Pension Plan through December 31, 1997, are fully protected and their value will be reflected in 
your new plan balance‖. Other statements to this effect were given in other disclosures. The 
court found that these notices were not written in a manner calculated to be understood by the 
average plan participant not only because participants could reasonably conclude that their early 
retirement benefits were protected when they were not but also because participants were given 
the impression that all of their benefits were being protected regardless whether they chose an 
annuity or a lump sum. It was not until July 2006 that CIGNA informed participants, in a 
coherent manner, that there were restrictions on the availability of early retirement benefits if the 
participant chose a lump sum distribution (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008). 
Plaintiffs claimed that CIGNA failed to comply with regulations requiring them to 
provide participants with information regarding the relative values of different benefit forms 
available to them upon retirement. They asserted that CIGNA was required to and did not inform 
plan participants: 
1. That the lump sum option did not include early retirement benefits available as 
part of the annuity. 
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2. That the annuity option was more valuable than the lump sum option. 
3. There was a disparity between the defined benefit plan and cash balance plan 
benefits; the comparisons between the values of the two benefits. 
4. Whether waiting for a future date to receive benefits would result in a higher 
amount of benefits. 
They argue that without this necessary information some participants chose a lump sum 
distribution when an annuity would have been more valuable (Amara v. Cigna Corp.). 
The terms of the cash balance plan stated that upon retirement a participant with accrued 
benefits under the defined benefit plan may choose upon retirement between either their cash 
balance plan benefit as a lump sum or their defined benefit plan benefit as an annuity. The lump 
sum could not be less than the equivalent actuarial value of the participant‘s minimum benefit; 
however, this minimum benefit did not include early retirement benefits (with the exception of 
the preserved spouse‘s benefit). On the other hand, the annuity included all early retirement 
benefits that the participant was eligible for under their defined benefit plan. The plaintiffs relied 
upon ERISA sections 203(e) and 205(g) which both required the written consent of a plan 
participant before retirement benefits exceeding $5,000 can be distributed as a lump sum. 
Treasury Regulation 1.401(a)-20, Q&A-36 stated that starting plan years beginning after 
December 31, 1988 participants must receive a general description of material features 
concerning optional forms of benefit as well as material that explains the relative value of these 
optional forms. Under the Code of Federal Regulations § 1.417(e)-1(b)(2)(i) a lump sum 
distribution is not valid if the participant does not receive a disclosure that satisfies the 
requirements of the aforementioned treasury regulation. For these reasons the court agreed with 
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the plaintiffs that CIGNA had a legal obligation to notify participants that the early retirement 
benefits under the defined benefit plan were only available through the annuity distribution 
option. It claimed that including early retirement benefits in the value of the annuity distribution 
without making clear that these benefits were not available under the lump sum option 
constituted insufficient disclosure. The court found that CIGNA violated ERISA and relevant 
Treasury regulations because they treated these two forms of benefits on their disclosure as 
though they were substantially equal; they should have included an explicit statement that early 
retirement benefits accrued under the old defined benefit plan were only available under the 
annuity form of distribution and were not part of the lump sum payment (Amara v. CIGNA 
Corp., 2008). 
The court disagreed with the plaintiff‘s assertion that they were not in compliance with 
applicable law when they had not informed participants that the annuity option was more 
valuable than the lump-sum option. More recent regulations issued on October 2004 identify this 
problem and address a solution stating that ―the description of the relative value of an optional 
form of benefit compared to the value of the [annuity] must be expressed in a manner that 
provides a meaningful comparison of the relative economic values of the two forms of benefit 
without the participant having to make calculations using interest or morality assumption‖. The 
court assumed that because this explicit treasury regulation was issued in 2004 this meant the 
previous version of the treasury regulations on the subject of annuity/lump sum value disclosure 
had not resolved to address this matter with this particular solution. They ruled that although 
employers could have chosen to provide present value comparisons between the lump sum and 
annuity options previously, they were not required to do so before the new 2004 regulations went 
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into effect. CIGNA expressed to the court that it had adjusted its disclosures to become in 
compliance with the new regulations after their effective date—it offered any employee that 
chose a less valuable benefit an opportunity to reconsider their choice. CIGNA‘s expert testified 
that if they had disclosed the present value of the annuity as well as the lump sum without further 
information they may have been misleading the participant. He also testified that not presenting a 
present value comparison was standard practice within the industry. The court held that even 
though the present value of the annuity may exceed a lump sum there was no unilateral 
disadvantage of one option over the other because the employee receiving the lump sum may 
benefit from the opportunity to invest the lump sum at their own discretion (Amara v. Cigna 
Corp., 2008).  
Concerning the plaintiff‘s claim that CIGNA had wrongfully neglected to inform 
participants with comparisons of ancillary benefits between the defined benefit plan and cash 
balance plan as well as failed to inform them on whether waiting for a future date to receive 
benefits would result in a higher amount of benefits, the court found that even though there is no 
support in the regulations that CIGNA was obligated to make these disclosures they still assumed 
an obligation because of statements they made in their disclosures. For example, CIGNA wrote 
in their 1998 and 1999 SPDs that ―[y]our final Plan benefits cannot be less than your old plan 
benefits on December 31, 1997. If this minimum benefits rule applies to you, you‘ll be notified 
by the Retirement Service Center when you request a distribution‖. The plan administrator at the 
time of the trial admitted that there was no specific disclosure that informed participants that they 
were going to be distributed the minimum benefit but instead CIGNA offered participants an 800 
number to call to ask specific questions about the calculation of benefits. The court disagreed 
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with CIGNA‘s argument that simply including the annuity under the defined benefit plan as a 
distribution option was enough to inform them that the minimum benefits rule applied to them. 
However, the court found that CIGNA was under no obligation to inform participants that they 
would eventually qualify for retirement benefits under their defined benefit plan if they 
postponed retirement. An example of this concept was that one of the Class members elected a 
lump sum distribution at age 54—had he waited until age 55 to retire he would have become 
eligible for early retirement benefits that would have granted him an annuity with twice the 
present value of the lump sum he received. Plaintiffs argued that this participant should have 
been informed of this prior. CIGNA argued that the treasury regulations on this matter only 
require them to inform participants on the benefits for which they are eligible and this participant 
was not eligible for that particular benefit yet. The court agreed with CIGNA and stated that to 
require otherwise would present a heavy administrative burden and no clear stopping point for 
obligations on the employer‘s disclosure (Amara v. CIGNA, 2008).  
j. Was There Injury? 
 
CIGNA‘s primary arguement in response to the plaintiff‘s inadequate disclosure claims 
was that even if they were defective the plaintiffs were entitled to relief because they could not 
demonstrate any injury done as a result of these inadequate disclosures (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 
2008). In Frommert v. Conkright, a case with a similar 204(h) contention, the judge emphasized 
the broad nature of ‗likely harm‘ because he ruled that the ―[plaintiffs] were deprived of the 
opportunity to take timely action in response to the purported ‗amendment‘. Such action might 
have included seeking injunctive relief, altering their retirement investment strategies, or perhaps 
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considering other employment‖. The judge also stated that ―[i]mposing a requirement that plan 
participants must show actual prejudice from a challenged plan amendment by terminating their 
employment imposes an unduly harsh burden on dissatisfied plan participants‖ (Frommert v. 
Conkright, 2006). CIGNA asserted that there was no injury because (1) ―none of the named 
plaintiffs left CIGNA as a result of perceived deficiencies in [the cash balance plan] or the 
related notices and disclosures‖, (2) the plaintiffs received sufficient information on their new 
cash balance plan from sources—including their opening account statements and total 
compensation reports—that cured any defects in any disclosures required by ERISA, and (3) 
even if the named plaintiffs received the information they claim was required and missing from 
disclosures their benefits under the cash balance plan would not have changed. The court did not 
consider the additional materials provided by CIGNA sufficient to cure the disclosure defects or 
―transform any possible [injury] into harmless error‖ (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008).  
The court rejected CIGNA‘s argument that no injury occurred to the plaintiff‘s class 
because none left employment on the grounds that the absence of certain required disclosures 
and the inclusion of inaccuracies in publications relating to the plan were likely to have led 
participants to believe that all the undesirable components of the amendments converting their 
defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan were not components within the amendment and new 
plan. The court also rejected CIGNA‘s third argument—no injury was made because the 
participant‘s benefits would not have changed had they received the degree of disclosure they 
claim they should have received—on the grounds that previous courts rejected the notion that the 
plaintiff could not have received injury if there was nothing they could have done to change their 
benefits in the first place. Ms. Amara herself testified that, had she been informed at her rehire 
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interview that she would be undergoing a wear-away period wherein there would be no 
additional retirement benefit accrual she could have ―negotiated for a higher salary‖, ―looked and 
talked to other employers‖, or stayed at her previous position (Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008).  
k. The Court‘s Remedy for CIGNA‘s Inadequate and Misleading Disclosure 
 
The US District Court of Connecticut believed that the remedy for CIGNA‘s disclosure 
misrepresentations would be to adapt the execution of the plan effective January 1998 to reflect 
how it was represented in the Summary Plan Description. Because CIGNA disclosed to its 
employers that their benefit will ―grow steadily throughout your career‖ this means that the SPD 
created a reasonable expectation to participants that the cash balance plan would protect all prior 
defined benefit plan benefits. Because the case was brought about under ERISA §501(a)(1)(B)—
to recover benefits due—the court decided to implement benefit accrual to the plaintiff‘s class 
under the plan to equal the accrued benefit under their defined benefit plan plus the accrued 
benefit under the cash balance plan—the A + B method. This approach contrasts with CIGNA‘s 
approach to provide the greater of defined benefit or cash balance—the A or B method. The 
remedy was called for because the participant‘s recovery needed to be based upon the sort of 
plan the participants thought they were going to receive given the SPDs and other notices. The 
disclosures did not mention wear-away, this approach removes wear-away. There was no 
mention in the disclosures of the potential for a loss in early retirement benefits under certain 
circumstances, now they will always have these benefits. The controversial determination of an 
opening account balance without early retirement benefits will become immaterial because the 
participant‘s opening balance will be zero and any additions will be credits added to their defined 
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benefit plan accrual. Adding together both plan benefits also remedies CIGNA‘s failure to notify 
employees that early retirement benefits were only available under the defined benefit plan 
annuity distribution because all prior defined benefit plan benefits would be automatically be 
provided in an annuity form. This approach also cures their failure to provide participants with a 
notification that the minimum benefits rule applies to them. The court found that—given their 
limited authority—there were no concrete means of remedying the impression that the summary 
of material modification made to participants that cash balance plan benefits were roughly 
comparable to those of the defined benefit plan.  (Janice C. Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008). 
II. Employer X, LLC 
a. 204(h) Notice & Previous DB Plan Benefits 
 
On June 2008 Employer X, LLC adopted an amendment converting its defined benefit 
plan to a cash balance plan effective January 1, 2008. The plan name was changed from 
Employer X, LLC Defined Benefit Plan to Employer X, LLC Cash Balance Plan. The plan 
document was individually drafted by Employer X‘s attorney which means they are required to 
amend and restate the plan for the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 
(―EGTRRA‖) as well as other current legislation sometime between February 2009 and the end 
of January 2010. They must then submit the plan to the Internal Revenue Service for approval 
and receive a favorable determination letter (see exhibit 1 in Appendix A for pg. 2 of attorney‘s 
letter dated May 23, 2008).  
The attorney provided them with a §204(h) notice (see exhibit 2 in Appendix A for pg. 1 
of the 204(h) notice). This notice included the statement, ―In no event will your benefit be less 
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than the benefit you have earned under the [defined benefit plan]‖ and that ―the benefit you earn 
under the new formula could me more or less than the benefit you would have earned under the 
plan had it not been amended‖. This is a clear disclosure of the likelihood that benefits may be 
reduced for the participant, this often happens as a result of the conversion from a defined benefit 
to a cash balance plan. As mentioned earlier, this is almost unilaterally the case unless the cash 
balance plan is remarkably generous to the participant because the defined benefit plan normally 
includes a final or a final-average index to derive benefits whereas the cash balance plan 
accumulates a final benefit that is indirectly indexed against career average earnings. In Atlantic 
Advisor‘s case this conversion clearly has a similar impact upon participants‘ final benefits. The 
§204(h) notice goes on to describe the old benefit formula, in compliance with post-2001 
requirements that the notice describe the benefit allocation prior to the amendment‘s effective 
date as well as the benefit allocation after the amendment‘s effective date. It stated that until June 
2008 the defined benefit plan formula was ―traditional‖ and benefits were defined based upon 
highest average pay and years of service. The formula was 10% of the average compensation 
over the 3 years of the participant‘s highest pay times years of credited service not to exceed 10 
years. This defined benefit formula was extremely generous because it granted the participant 
very large growth over a ten year period and a total of 100% of highest average compensation 
after only ten years of service. The notice goes on to state that participant‘s benefits under their 
previous plan will be frozen as of June 2008—the years of credited service and new average 
compensation are no longer factored into the participant‘s final benefit with respect to the old 
formula. This means that not only were participants no longer allowed to receive an extra ten 
percent of their greatest average pay per year, it also means the percentage of benefit they 
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receive will not be based upon their career earnings, just pre-June 2008 earnings. Average-
highest or final-highest earnings have historically been a remedy to concerns that retirement 
benefits will not remain abreast of rising inflation, cost or living, and even the participant‘s 
standard of living. The notice then states (see exhibit 3 in Appendix A for pg. 2 of the 204(h) 
notice) that the new pension formula will take effect on the same day that the old defined benefit 
plan assets were frozen. It also states that the new plan benefit will be added to the frozen benefit 
in order to determine the total benefit under the plan. This disclosure illustrates that the new plan 
is drafted in compliance with the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (―PPA‖) which added ERISA 
§204(h)(5)(B)(ii) stating that participants subject to a defined benefit plan conversion cannot 
have a benefit less than the sum of their accrued benefits for years of service prior to the 
effective date of the amendment and accrued benefits for years of service after the effective date 
of the amendment.  
b. Initial Account Balance? 
 
The disclosure also states that their new benefit will be the value of their cash balance 
account determined by contribution credits that are a percentage of total compensation and 
interest credits for each year until distribution. Additionally, all participants‘ initial cash balance 
account will be zero. This detail is in contrast to CIGNA‘s method of calculating an initial 
account balance based on a present value of the future defined benefit annuity due. As previously 
mentioned, there are no regulations requiring a particular method of determining the participants‘ 
initial account balance upon conversion from a defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan—the 
very concept and approach is entirely at the discretion of the employer. So why did CIGNA 
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calculate an initial account for each participant when they could have just given zero treatment to 
previously accrued benefits after establishing a minimum benefits rule? The approach CIGNA 
took greatly reduced wear-away for all participants—they would otherwise have had to re-earn 
all of their minimum benefits before being able to grow their benefit accrual. This approach may 
also have, arguably, been a further attempt by CIGNA to conceal the significant reduction in 
future potential benefit accrual by granting non-grandfathered participants an account balance 
with a value which they can witness rise overtime through their annual account statements. Their 
other attempts to lighten the participants‘ perception concerning the grave reduction of benefits 
resulting from the cash balance amendment through defective plan disclosures would suggest 
that their motives were to limit transparency by actively limiting doubt on the part of the 
participants. Employer X‘s need to comply with the regulatory requirements that they provide a 
benefit equal to prior accrued benefits plus a benefit accrual after the amendment renders the 
concept of calculating an initial account balance to be somewhat functionally redundant with the 
exception of interest credit accruals.  If they were to calculate an initial account balance then 
they could exclude the initial corpus in order to ensure that additional accruals based upon 
compounding interest would be the only factor to raise their future benefit and would ultimately 
be included among benefits earned after the defined benefit conversion amendment. When 
considering the benefit accrual already earned, this would have been a great way to gradually 
increase the participant‘s benefit for the purpose of keeping the participant‘s benefit abreast of 
increases in living costs and inflation particularly if the interest credit is indexed against the 
interest rates on U.S. Treasury bills. This is another instance where benefit accruals that have 
been historically utilized for the purpose of adjusting a participant‘s benefit for inflation and cost 
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of living are removed by plan amendments implemented for the purpose of converting a defined 
benefit plan to a cash balance plan. Granted, if Employer X had implemented interest credit 
accrual the way CIGNA had—the return on 5-year treasury bills plus .25% not to exceed 9% or 
be lower than 4.5%—they would be receiving a more generous benefit than a cost of living 
adjustment would require. However, this would still not be taking into account rising 
compensation, which was frozen, it would only be taking into account average compensation par 
the structure of the cash balance plan accrual. In fact, assuming the same 4.5% annual salary 
increase used in the Amara v. Cigna Corp. example illustrating that the defined benefit plan 
accrual rate was approximately twice the cash balance plan accrual rate relative to final pay, the 
interest accrual would only reflect average salary increases because treasury bills are not likely to 
rise past 4.5%. Thus, this alternate approach could either be considered a supplement for future 
salary increases or insurance against inflation and the rising cost of living. In either case, this 
approach was not implemented by Employer X which illustrates the loss of the structural 
safeguards inherent in the participant‘s previous method of benefit accrual. These disadvantages 
persist despite the protections under ERISA §204(h)(5)(B)(ii). 
c. Definition of ―Compensation‖ 
 
The notice goes on to state that beginning January 2008 credits would be contributed to 
the participant‘s account at the end of each plan year based upon their total compensation. Their 
compensation is defined in the notice as ―wages, salary, fees for professional services and other 
amounts received for personal services rendered in the course of employment‖. In section 5 of 
the Adoption Agreement (―AA‖) compensation for the purpose of the plan is defined as ―Code 
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§415 Compensation‖ with ―no exclusions‖ (see exhibit 5 in Appendix A for pg. 4 of the 
Adoption Agreement). ERISA §415(c)(3) defines ―participant‘s compensation‖ simply to mean 
―compensation of the participant from the employer for the year‖. With no exclusions chosen, 
Employer X had forgone the option to credit participant‘s accounts a smaller amount than they 
would have otherwise. For example, if bonuses were excluded then an employee that makes 
more than half of their total salary in bonuses would be credited a much smaller percentage of 
their total compensation than somebody that makes all of their salary in non-bonus 
compensation. This could create plan qualification issues if these practices result in a Qualified 
Plan that is discriminatory against certain employees. The notice also states that the participant‘s 
total compensation may be limited to the legal maximum established by the IRS which was 
$230,000 for the calendar year in which the amendment was effective. This legal maximum is 
established by ERISA §415 and §401(a)(17) which states that a ―trust shall not constitute a 
qualified trust under this section unless…the annual compensation of each employee taken into 
account under the plan for any year does not exceed $200,000‖ which is increased by $5,000 for 
cost-of-living adjustments. This limitation proportionally lowers the utility value of a Qualified 
Plan to any participant that receives compensation exceeding this amount. This particular 
limitation applies to nondiscrimination, defined benefit plans, and defined contribution plans but 
the nature of the cash balance individual account format allows for heavy applicability to the 
annual compensation limit because the employer‘s contribution credit is a fixed percentage of the 
participant‘s annual salary.  
The 204(h) notice goes on (See exhibit 4 in Appendix A for pg. 3 of the 204(h) notice) to 
describe the interest credits applied to the participant‘s account, ―[t]he interest crediting rate is 
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determined each year and is equal to the interest rate published‖. This illustrates the 
permissibility of selective ambiguities within the 204(h) notice—while the notice specifically 
illustrated the formula determining the participant‘s benefit under their prior defined benefit plan 
it defined no particular percentage of compensation for their annual credit and no interest rate to 
compound their annual credit. However, Treasury Regulations 54.4980F-1 Q&A-11 asserts that 
if the amendment reduces the rate of future benefit accrual then the 204(h) notice ―must include a 
description of the benefit allocation formula prior to the amendment [and] a description of the 
benefit or allocation formula under the plan as amended‖. This notice, alone, clearly lacks the 
description of the cash balance plan required by this regulation. It is possible that given the 
required A+B benefit accrual approach taken by Employer X that there was no future reduction 
in future benefits. This is somewhat likely given the fact that the company is a closely held LLC 
with a plan that accrues nearly full benefits after only 10 years of service. However, the first 
effective date of Employer X‘s defined benefit plan was January 1, 2004 (see exhibit 6 in 
Appendix A for pg. 2 of the DB plan document)— the first participants only made accruals 
based on at most 4 years of service. The participants‘ accrual, even if carried over without wear-
away, was theoretically reduced given the career average nature of the cash balance plan as well 
as the reduced annual benefit credit that resulted.  
d. Are They Obligated to Provide a 204(h) Notice? 
A Comparison of Participants’ Benefit Accrual; Review of the Census 
 
Section 5 in the Adoption Agreement of Employer X‘s cash balance plan (see exhibit 5 in 
Appendix A for pg. 4, 5 and addendum 1 of the AA) partitioned all employees into groups and 
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defined the annual contribution credits made to each group. Group A is the owner and managing 
member of Employer X and he received a contribution credit ―equal to 100% of the Maximum 
Contribution Credit‖. This Contribution Credit is defined in the Plan Document (see exhibit 7 in 
Appendix A for pg. 15 of the Plan Document) as ―equal to 10% of the actuarial present value of 
the Defined Benefit Dollar Limitation applicable to the Participant for the Plan Year‖. This 
references 26 U.S.C. §415 which states that a trust is no longer a qualified trust—no longer 
receives benefits due to Qualified Plans under ERISA and is, thus, disqualified—if ―[annual] 
[b]enefits with respect to a participant exceed…the lesser of $160,000 or 100 percent of the 
participant‘s average compensation for his high 3 years‖. This annual benefit would be in the 
form of a straight life annuity and the $160,000 is adjusted annually by a multiple of $5,000 at 
the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. The defined benefit limit as of 2008 was 
$185,000 which means that—given the plan language ―for the Plan Year‖—the present value of 
a straight life annuity that would have provided an annual benefit of 18,500 after retirement was 
added to his account balance at the end of the 2008 plan year. This means that he receives 
approximately one tenth of his maximum benefit every year. Given that his compensation has 
been far greater than the §401(a)(17) annual compensation limitation (see exhibit 8 in Appendix 
A for the employee census) and that every participant received an extra ten percent of their 
compensation every year under the old defined benefit formula, it is not likely that the 
owner/managing partner experienced any reduction in future benefit accrual. The rest of the 
employees are granted a more typical credit allocation—the owner‘s spouse (Group B) receives 
40% of compensation annually, the ―Trading Principal‖ (Group C): 30%, the ―Business 
Development Principal‖ (Group D): 30%, the Director of Marketing (Group E): 10%, the spouse 
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of ―Trading Principal‖ (Group F): 50%, the Senior Vice President of Trading (Group G): 0%, 
and all other Employees (Group H): 7%. (I will not be discussing the non-discrimination issues 
surrounding these disparities due to the appalling degree of explanation necessary including a 
thorough examination of Employer X‘s supplemental 401(k)). The plan only credited the 
participants‘ years of service (see exhibit 9 in Appendix A for page 8 of the DB plan adoption 
agreement) so the sole member of Group H that became a participant on July 1st, 2007 had not 
yet accrued any vested or un-vested benefit. Group H accumulated service based upon years after 
becoming a participant because the plan was amended before her hire to begin crediting only 
service as a participant. Before this, when Groups A, B and D were the only other employees at 
Employer X, the plan credited service based upon total service since hire not counting breaks in 
service. This amendment was beneficial to these initial three participants because they created an 
extra free year wherein they were not required to fund this particular participant‘s accrual. Given 
the particularly generous nature of the Employer X‘s defined benefit plan the savings were large. 
If Group H had accumulated one year of service the participant would have accrued an annual 
benefit of approximately 4,266 (42,655*10%  see exhibit 10 in Appendix A) payable upon 
retirement. The present value of this based on certain annuity assumptions would be the 
additional funding liability for the Employer. This amendment to credited service was 
nondiscriminatory and did not apply to the other groups because it was enacted before Group H‘s 
hire. The only employees that had accrued a benefit were Group A, B, and D. Group B was fully 
vested in the accrued benefit, had 5 years of credited service at 2008 and thus accumulated an 
accrual of 50% highest average compensation earned before 2008. This participant‘s new benefit 
would be a contribution credit of 40% of compensation annually. This would be compounded by 
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an interest credit rate equal to 30-year Treasury securities (see exhibit 5 in Appendix A). This 
information confirms that there was a general reduction in future benefit accrual on at least one 
participant—the old accrual and highest average service calculation was frozen and the new 
benefit provides only a career average benefit based upon only 40% of the participant‘s 
compensation, less than the percentage the participant earned at the time of the amendment. It is 
noteworthy that the 204(h) notice was entirely clear on disclosing the fact that the old benefit 
will be reduced. Also, unlike CIGNA the notice makes no assertions with respect to the benefits 
of this amendment. Whereas CIGNA‘s notices make claims about benefit ―enhancements‖ et 
cetera, Employer X‘s 204(h) notice simply states that ―depending on your circumstances, the 
benefit you earned under the new formula could be more or less than the benefit you would have 
earned under the plan had it not been amended‖. Group D was under similar circumstances only 
they had accrued benefit equal to 30% of her compensation upon the defined benefit plan 
conversion and was subsequently entitled to a contribution credit of 30% of her salary. As 
previously discussed, the compounding interest credit could reasonably be considered a 
supplement to future salary growth. Thus, it is theoretically possible that she receives an equal or 
greater benefit accrual than she had under the cash balance plan especially if Group D‘s salary 
never rises over time. This notice, though not materially in compliance with regulations, is 
nonetheless very truthful in its assertions—some participant may earn more, some may earn less 
―depending on your circumstances‖. 
To supplement this point, there is no regulatory imperative for an employer to investigate 
the impact a defined benefit plan amendment has on its participants‘ future benefit accrual. 
Therefore, the employer is under no obligation to engage in the preliminary activities that would 
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determine whether 204(h) notices are necessary. Any penalties for deficiencies on the 
contingency requirement concerning the 204(h) notice would have to arise from litigation and 
from there it would have to be proven that the employer was aware of material reductions in 
participants‘ future benefit accrual. Granted, it could be argued that Employer X had already 
indicated that they were aware of material future benefit accrual reductions because they issued a 
204(h) notice in the first place; perhaps disbursing a 204(h) notice without foreknowledge of 
future benefit reduction reflects precautionary practices. This precaution, however, still lacks the 
necessary description of the plan as amended. Also, given the fact that participant disclosures 
will not be reviewed by either the DOL or the IRS except in the instance of an audit or other 
investigation, there are few immediate penalties for vague content within a 204(h) notice. This 
means that any employer that lacks any reason to believe an investigation will occur would not 
have very much incentive to be in compliance with the many disclosure regulations established 
by the IRS and the DOL. Very large employers are typically audited every year and small 
employers such as Employer X are a lot less likely to be targeted for an audit. On a relative scale, 
this means that the need for disclosure becomes more a matter of providing greater transparency 
to the employees in order to preempt any backlash or complaints they may have to the DOL if 
any changes were not made apparent. 
Interest Credit on the 204(h) notice 
 
Employer X‘s 204(h) notice simply stated that interest credits ―are determined by 
multiplying your account balance on January 1 by the interest crediting rate for the plan year‖ 
and that the interest credit will be prorated for the year in the event that the participant terminates 
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employment. This means that the fraction of the year passed before termination would determine 
the fraction of the entire interest credit that would otherwise have been granted. This degree of 
clarity is conducive to an effective 204(h) notice except it omits the fact that the interest credit 
rate is indexed based upon 30-year Treasury securities. This omission is likely immaterial 
because the interest credit is not particular to any class of employee and the notice does not 
indicate otherwise in its statements. The notice‘s silence on specifics does not prevent the 
participant from asking the plan administrator—the notice concludes with the statement, ―If you 
have any questions, please do not hesitate to contract me‖. 
The 204(h) Notice: “Comparing Old and New Formulas”  
 
Finally, under the last heading in the Employer X 204(h) notice titled ―Comparing Old 
and New Formulas‖ (see exhibit 4 in Appendix A) the disclosure states: 
In some cases, the new pension formula will provide a better pension benefit than would 
have been provided under the old formula. There may, however, be instances where the 
old formula would have provided a better benefit had it continued to apply. 
Treasury Regulations 54.4980F-1 Q&A-11 asserts that if the amendment reduces the rate of 
future benefit accrual then the 204(h) notice ―must include sufficient information for each 
applicable individual to determine the approximate magnitude of the expected reduction‖ and 
that ―any case in which it is not reasonable to expect that the approximate magnitude of the 
reduction…will be apparent from the description of the amendment…further information is 
required‖ and that this information is sufficient if it includes ―one or more illustrative examples 
showing the approximate magnitude of the reduction‖ for the individual receiving the notice. It 
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also states that examples are required for any change in a defined benefit plan that involves wear 
away. Because Employer X‘s amendment is an A+B conversion from a DB to a Cash Balance 
there is no wear-away. The language of the regulation indicates that examples are generally 
sufficient but not necessary to illustrate the magnitude of reduction, they are only necessary in 
the case of wear-away. This is another instance where Employer X‘s 204(h) notice is missing 
information that regulations require. Granted, the contingency is based upon whether the new 
plan reduces future benefit rate accrual and the 204(h) notice states that the participant may or 
may not have a future benefit accrual reduction. Having observed the Participant‘s prior and 
subsequent benefits this has been deemed to be the case. 
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CHAPTER III: CONCLUSION 
 
These two cases highlight the concept that the degree of ownership concerning a 
Qualified Plan is contingent upon the activities undertaken by the Employer with respect to the 
plan. Most notably, ownership of the Qualified Plan is only entirely granted to the Employer 
under two particular circumstances. These circumstances are (1) the IRS and DOL do not 
determine that the Plan is contrary to ERISA in form or execution and (2) the courts do not deem 
that the Plan Sponsor (Employer) has inflicted injury upon any participants. This latter point is 
demonstrated by the 2008 Amara v. Cigna Corp court‘s decision to modify the form and 
execution of CIGNA‘s plan retroactively. They ruled that CIGNA Corp. must adapt the 
execution of their plan effective January 1998 to ensure that their conversion followed the ―A 
plus B‖ method of DB-to-cash balance conversion instead of CIGNA‘s choice of the ―A or B‖ 
method. The Pensions Protection Act of 2006 added section §204(h)(5)(B)(ii) to ERISA which 
established a new requirement for all employers implementing a cash balance plan to take an 
A+B approach for all DB to cash balance plan transitions after June 29, 2005. This means that 
the participant‘s cash balance plan credits must represent accrued benefits that are added to the 
already accrued DB plan benefits. This means that CIGNA‘s inadequate disclosure to 
participants simply resulted in the employer missing the opportunity to implement an ―A-or-B‖ 
approach—the greater of accrued cash balance plan benefits OR accrued defined benefit plan 
benefits (Janice C. Amara v. Cigna Corp., 2008). Congress had already been called upon by 
pension experts as early as 2000 to pass legislation guaranteeing that the DB plan accruals are 
guaranteed to the participant before additional accruals under the cash balance are added as a 
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supplement to their already earned benefit (United States Congress, 2000). CIGNA‘s forced 
conversion to an A plus B method in their DB plan conversion up to 2008 also means that 
CIGNA was forced to cede their ownership of the plan by the Second District Court of Appeals.  
The reversibility of amendments and resultant accruals within a plan indicates a lack of 
ownership by the employer. It is noteworthy that CIGNA‘s revocation of ownership only applied 
during the time period between the effective date of the amendment and the court‘s ruling on the 
impermissibility of the amendment. The Employer upon compliance will thereafter have 
complete control over the Qualified Plan again and can pass any amendment they wish. To 
reiterate, there is no requirement that a plan qualified under ERISA may not have participants 
experience wear-away. Therefore, CIGNA is certainly permitted to pass another amendment 
reducing future potential benefit accruals but the court‘s mandate ensures that all participants 
accrue their benefit first—the benefit that is not permitted to be reduced under the anti-cutback 
rule. CIGNA‘s 1998 conversion amendment was not impermissible for its inherent illegality per 
se but was impermissible given the Employer‘s attempts to conceal the amendment‘s effects 
upon the participant. They also treated the lump-sum distribution as equal to the annuity 
distribution even though the lump-sum excluded the participant‘s accruals in early retirement 
benefits. Since the SMM, the SPD, and the 204(h) notice gave the impression that benefits would 
always grow CIGNA is now forced to change its formula to ensure that this is true despite never 
having signed an Adoption Agreement or executed a Plan Document to this effect. The mandate 
was to establish the sort of benefit the participant would presumably have expected to receive 
given the language of the disclosures they received by CIGNA (the lump-sum and annuity 
disparity becoming void because the DB benefits including early retirement benefits would be 
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distributed as an annuity no matter what the participant did with the cash balance portion of their 
distribution). The act of compliance to this mandate will be a government action and not an act 
based upon the Employer‘s ownership of the plan. 
Not all insufficient disclosures required remedial action as a result. Even though 
participants may be injured by CIGNA‘s silence on the fact that the annuity option provided 
more benefits than the lump-sum distribution, applicable law and regulations had not mandated 
them to do so and therefore it was permissible. It was not until October 2004 that regulations to 
this effect were published and at that point CIGNA began to provide sufficient information to 
participants on this matter. What had been standard practice in the industry and was not in 
contradiction with published regulations was permissible—this alone did not result in a cessation 
of plan ownership for the plan years up to 2008. What did result—along with the rest of their 
transgressions—in the cessation of the plan to the federal government were CIGNA‘s misleading 
statements to the participants that gave the impression that the lump-sum option was equivalent 
to the annuity option. Similar to material omissions in required disclosures to participants, being 
found by a court to have misled the participant directly resulted in a cessation of ownership to 
the federal government. This type of misleading statement included CIGNA‘s claim that they 
would notify the participant if the minimum benefit rule applied to them because they had not 
done so. 
CIGNA attempted to argue that there was no injury because participants could not prove 
that they would have performed any significant action if all the inadequate and misleading 
disclosures were portrayed appropriately.  The court established that injury could be made to the 
participant when the Employer intentionally removes their opportunity to make timely action in 
  67 
response to any amendments to the plan. This illustrates ERISA‘s legislative intent with respect 
to the SMM, SPD, and the 204(h) notice. Because the IRS and the DOL do not review 
disclosures except in the case of an audit or other investigation, scrutiny by the courts has 
generally been the primary means by which Employers could be forced to cede ownership of the 
plan due to the inadequacy and/or inaccuracies of their disclosures. For this reason participants 
must often be wary of their Employer because there is little authoritative oversight over the 
content of their disclosures. 
The Amara v. Cigna Corp. case illustrates that the Employer must cede ownership of the 
plan during the years the courts deem that an injury has been dealt to participants. The Employer 
X, LLC study conversely reveals that there happens to be a lot more comprehensive plan 
ownership when the Plan Sponsor is a small closely-held business.  The case brought against 
CIGNA was a class action lawsuit involving tens of thousands of current and former participants 
against their Employer. This class action approach made it a lot easier to pool resources in order 
to attempt to retrieve the benefits to which they thought they were entitled. This particular 
approach would be nearly impossible for a participant in a plan sponsored by a small Employer. 
This is one of the key reasons that the small Employer has less concern for strict compliance to 
ERISA relative to large employers. While all individually drafted plans—the kind that would be 
preferable for Employers wishing to maximize influential HCEs‘ benefit—need to be submitted 
to the IRS for a favorable determination letter, the disclosures to participants in particular are not 
under scrutiny by the IRS. Also, the IRS generally audits large Employers every year whereas 
small Employers are audited at random. Thus, small employers are under significantly less risk 
of being forced to cede ownership of their plan to the government. 
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Employer X‘s 204(h) notice did not adequately compare their old DB plan accrual to the 
cash balance plan accrual. Their noncompliance with Treasury Regulations were not nearly as 
demonstrative of deceit as they were in the CIGNA case but it is still noteworthy how little 
disclosure is permissible given the lax regulations and oversight over them. Because no 
complaints were filed and no resultant investigation was made, this sort of disclosure passed its 
very informal compliance test without adhering to certain regulations specific to the 204(h) 
notice. It is clear that the Employer was obligated to provide participants with a 204(h) notice 
because Group B‘s future benefit accrual was obviously reduced and it is very likely that all of 
the other Employees‘ potential benefit accruals—with the exception of the owner—were reduced 
as well. Because there is no regulatory imperative for an employer to investigate the impact of a 
DB to cash balance amendment, vague language with respect to comparisons appear to be 
appropriate for the purposes of 204(h) notice but this can not yet be confirmed in Employer X‘s 
case because the disclosures were not and would likely never be challenged in court. 
The language in Employer X‘s 204(h) notice resembles CIGNA‘s disclosure language 
when it states that ―In some cases, the new pension formula will provide a better pension benefit 
than would have been provided under the old formula.‖ Compare this with CIGNA‘s, ―…exact 
comparisons of benefits that cover all possible outcomes are difficult…[the plan] tends to 
provide larger benefits for shorter-service employees and comparable benefits for longer-service 
employees…‖  The nuance of the differences highlights CIGNA‘s failure to convert their plan 
the way they wished. The content of Employer X‘s notice is expressly vague whereas the 
language of CIGNA‘s disclosure is vague yet it still implies substance. CIGNA‘s ultimate 
surrender of their qualified plan to the terms of the federal government was less a result of their 
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omissions and more a result of their attempts to make affirmative statements regarding their new 
Qualified Plan. Their statements regarding ―enhancements‖ ―comparable benefits‖ and that 
―your benefit will grow steadily‖ were contrary to the substance and execution of the plan 
document and thus the plan document needed to be revised by the federal government to reflect 
these statements. No such affirmative statements were made by Employer X and therefore it is 
very likely that their disclosures, however inadequate, will go unchallenged given the very broad 
degree of freedom granted to the Plan Sponsor of the Qualified Plan by the Federal Government 
of the United States. 
In summation, ownership of the Qualified Plan is maintained only if the IRS and DOL 
determine that the plan is not contrary to ERISA in form or execution and if the courts do not 
deem that the Plan Sponsor has inflicted injury upon participants. This latter point was illustrated 
by CIGNA‘s court mandate to retroactively convert their ―A or B‖ cash balance plan to an ―A 
plus B‖ cash balance plan. This mandate demonstrates the Employer‘s loss of ownership as a 
result of having done injury to the participant. Both aforementioned points are also illustrated by 
Employer X‘s inadequate disclosure and how it passed a necessarily informal compliance test. 
The courts had no capacity to determine any inflicted injury and the IRS and DOL had not 
determined that the plan was contrary to ERISA in form or execution; therefore, Employer X‘s 
ownership of the plan was maintained. 
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Exhibit 1: page 2 of attorney‘s letter to Employer dated May 23, 2009 
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Exhibit 2: page 1 of 204(h) notice 
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Exhibit 3: page 2 of 204(h) notice 
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Exhibit 4: page 3 of 204(h) notice 
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Exhibit 5: page 4, 5 and addendum-1 of the cash balance plan‘s Adoption Agreement 
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Exhibit 6: page 2 of the DB Adoption Agreement 
 
  79 
Exhibit 7: page 15—plan document of the cash balance plan 
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Exhibit 8: Employee Census 
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Exhibit 9: page 8 of the DB Adoption Agreement 
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APPENDIX B:  
UNDEFINED TERMS 
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(All definitions are reproduced verbatim from Sal Tripodi‘s The ERISA Outline Book 2011 
Edition with the exception of Highly Compensated Employee which is paraphrased) 
Alternate Payee— May be a spouse, a former spouse, or a child or other dependent of the 
participant, ―who is recognized by a domestic relations order as having a right to receive all, 
or a portion of, the benefits payable under the plan with respect to the participant.‖ 
 
Employee— A common law employee as determined under common law employer-
employee principles, who is or was employed by the employer that maintains the plan, or a 
self-employed individual with respect to the trade or business that maintains the plan. 
 
Employer— The employer is any employer (under common law principles) of the 
employees covered by the plan. Only an employer may establish a qualified plan, and the 
plan must be exclusively for the benefit of the employees (or former employees) of the 
employer and the beneficiaries of those employees or former employees. The IRS maintains 
that a plan ceases to be a qualified plan if the sponsoring employer goes out of business, 
unless a successor employer takes over sponsorship of the plan. 
 
Fiduciary— A person is a fiduciary if he is described in A., B. or C. below. 
A. Management. The person exercises any discretionary authority or 
discretionary control respecting management of the plan, or exercises any 
authority or control respecting management or disposition of assets. 
  84 
B. Investment advice. The person renders investment advice for a fee or other 
compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any assets of the plan, or has 
any authority or responsibility to render such advice even if not actually 
rendered.  
C. Administration. The person has any discretionary authority or discretionary 
responsibility in the administration of the plan. 
 
Highly Compensated Employee— An employee is an HCE for a plan year if the employee 
meets one of two tests: the five-percent owner test or the compensation test. The five-percent 
owner test is if the Employee owns more than 5% of the Employer including attributed 
ownership. The compensation test is if the employee received—during the previous year—
more than a dollar amount indexed for cost of living adjustments. This amount was $105,000 
during 2008. 
 
Participant— A participant is an employee or former employee who is covered by the plan. 
 
Plan Administrator— The plan administrator is the person designated to be responsible for 
the administration and operation of the plan and, as such, is a named fiduciary with respect to 
the plan. The plan administrator is the person identified as the administrator in the plan 
document. 
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Plan Document— The written document setting forth the terms of the plan, including the 
eligibility and vesting requirements, how benefits are determined, and when benefits may be 
distributed. 
 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”)— A domestic relations order that 
provides for the payment of all or a portion of the participant's benefits to an "alternate 
payee". 
 
Vested— An ownership right in the benefits under the plan. The term nonforfeitable is also 
used interchangeably with the term vested. An employee's vested accrued benefit is the 
portion of the accrued benefit that cannot be forfeited except under very limited 
circumstances 
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